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NOTES
THE CASE FOR UNIFORM UNION-SECURITY
REGULATION
The magnitude of labor forces, increasing concern over paralyz-
ing strikes, and the influence of union-management relationships on the
individual, community, and nation have pushed labor issues into prom-
inence. Congress has established a national policy of encouraging labor
and management to bargain collectively. While the Labor Management
Relations Act' permits unions and employers to enter contracts that allow
selection of workers without regard to their union or non-union status,
the contract may require such employees to affiliate with the representa-
tive union after a probationary period. But the same Act further pro-
vides that states may enact more stringent union-security restrictions
applicable to labor relations in enterprises which conduct operations in
more than one state. 2 Thus, union-security agreements are subject to
regulation by both national and state governments.3 As might be expected,
such concurrent legislation gives rise to conflicts between application of
federal and state regulations, thus causing difficulty in determining the
1. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1952). Here-
after the Act is referred to as LMRA; section references are to that Act.
2. Conventional union-security measures pertinent herein are the closed and union
shops. Closed-shop provisions provide absolute union protection; the employer obligates
himself to hire only union members, and employees must maintain union affiliation to
retain their positions. The congressionally-indorsed union-shop contract requires all
employees to become union members and retain membership but permits the employer
to select workers at will. The contract specifies a probationary period after which an
employee must affiliate with the union or lose his job.
3. Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act states: "Nothing in this Act shall be
construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in
which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."
In reviewing pertinent sections of the Act in the case of Algoma Plywood and
Veneer Co. v. Wisconsii Emplo3nzent Relations Board, the United States Supreme Court
left no doubt that the states are free to restrict union-security devices more severely
than does the federal law. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in delivering the Court's opinion,
proclaimed: "Other provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act make it even clearer than the
National Labor Relations Act that the states are left free to pursue their own more
restrictive policies in the matter of union-security agreements. Because § 8(a) (3) of the
new Act forbids the closed shop and strictly regulates the conditions under which a
union-shop agreement may be entered, § 14(b) was included to forestall the inference
that federal policy was to be exclusive." 336 U.S. 301, 313-314 (1949).
Congress too has stated: "It was never the intention of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as is disclosed by the legislative history of that act, to preempt the field in
this regard so as to deprive the States of their powers to prevent compulsory unionism."
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proper groups of employees to be permitted to enter security agreements
with their employers. In addition, conflicting federal and state laws
permit some workers to demand and secure union benefits without any
contribution to, or membership in, the union.
The LMRA, in addition to prohibiting closed-shop agreements,
4
prescribes rules concerning employer and union activity which affects
the sanctioned forms of union security.5 State legislation regulating
union security invokes various means designed to prevent discrimination
in hire or tenure of workers on conditions of union or non-union status.
6
While all such state acts proscribe employment dependent on union
affiliation, some statutes declare the entire employment contract void,
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1947). See H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1935) ; SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935).
The Supreme Court asserted the validity of a Nebraska constitutional amendment
and a North Carolina right-to-work statute, each more restrictive than Taft-Hartley
union-security provisions, in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). The same day the Court affirmed the constitutionality
of a similar Arizona enactment in American Federation of Labor v. American Sash &
Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949). However, the Court reversed without opinion a Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court decision upholding the state labor board's jurisdiction in Plankinton
Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 338 U.S. 953 (1950), reversing
255 Wis. 285, 38 N.W.2d 688 (1949). The Court did cite Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1949) and LaCrosse Telephone Corp.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 18 (1949). The Plankinton decision
has occasioned some controversy as to the meaning of the cryptic reversal. See 53 Col.
L. Rev. 258, 260-265 (1953) ; 1 LAB. L.J. 419 (1950). Apparently Plankinton, in its
denial of jurisdiction to the state agencies, indicates that federal policy remains supreme
in other areas of congressional labor legislation, because both the Bethlehem and LaCrosse
decisions relied in part on possible conflicts in the exercise of discretion between the
NLRB and state labor boards. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor
Relations Board, supra at 775-776, and LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, supra at 25-26. See also International Union of United Auto.
Workers, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1949).
4. § 8(a) (3).
5. Section 8(a) (3) elaborately specifies the conditions under which an employer
may enter a union-shop agreement. Section 7 guarantees to each worker the right to
join or refrain from joining a labor organization except as that right may be abridged
by § 8(a) (3). Union tactics are curtailed by § 8(b) (1) which restrains union activities
as they affect workers' rights and by § 8(b) (2) which admonishes the union not to
force the employer to violate § 8(a) (3).
6. The following state statutes prohibit employment conditioned on union status:
ARiz. CODE ANN. § 56-1302 (Supp. 1952); AKc. CONsT. AmE-D. XXXIV, § 1 (1947);
COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 97, § 94(6) (1) (c) (1935) (all-union agreement permitted if
authorized by three-fourths secret vote); FLA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 12 (1951)
GA. CODE ANN. § 54-804 (Supp. 1951); IowA CODE ANN. c. 736A, § 736A.2 (1950);
KAN. GEN. STAT. § 44-809(4) (1949) (all-union agreement permitted if authorized by
majority vote of employees in bargaining unit) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-217 (Supp. 1951)
(laws to render operative NEB. CoNsT. Art. XV, §§ 13, 14, 15) ; 31 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref.
Man.) 3009 (Nevada initiative petition approved Nov. 4, 1952) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-
81 (1950) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 34-0114 (Supp. 1949) ; S.D. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 2 (1939) ;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 11412.8 (Williams 1934); TEX. STAT. REV. Civ. art. 5207a, § 2
(1948) ; VA. CODE § 40-70 (1950) ; Wis. STAT. § 111.06(1) (c)1 (1951) (all-union agree-
ment permitted if authorized by two-thirds secret vote).
NOTES
unlawful, or illegal.7 Two statutes stipulate that it is unlawful to enter
into a contract which conditions job hire or tenure on the workers'
organized status.8 Several enactments permit employees to recover
damages for denial or deprivation of employment 9 and some afford in-
junctive relief against threatened discriminatory action.Y0 Four acts
label violation of union-security restrictions a misdemeanor and inflict
fines from $100 to $50011 while one state provides for imprisonment
not to exceed twelve months.' 2
Prior to the repeal of Section 9(e) (1) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the
National Labor Relations Board confronted a chaos of union-shop
elections in bargaining units stretching beyond state boundaries. 13 Com-
plexity of determining employee units in which to hold elections to comply
with this section created confusion not only on the Board but among em-
ployees as well because of the rigors of varying degrees of federal and state
union-security regulation. Illustrative of this confusion is the Northland
Greyhound Lines case where the Board was petitioned by a bargaining
unit to hold an election in an area encompassing eight states and the
Province of Manitoba, Canada.14 Four states were silent on union-
security regulation ;15 three states prohibited union security in any form ;16
one state required employee authorization of union-security agreements
by a two-thirds vote.17 The Board's solution was to establish the locus
of the employees' headquarters as the criterion for determining which
state's law is applicable in such situations.' In Western Electric Co.,
7. Amiz. CODE ANN. § 56-1303 (Supp. 1952); N.C. GE. STAT. § 95-79 (1950);
TEX. STAT., REV. Cirv. art. 5207a, § 3 (1948) ; VA. CODE § 40-69 (1950).
8. IOWA CODE ANN. c. 736A, § 736A.3 (1950); TENN. CODE ANN. § 11412.9
(Williams 1934).
9. ARiZ. CODE ANN. § 56-1306 (Supp. 1952); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-908 (Supp.
1951).; N.C, GE. STAT. §95-83 (1950); V.A. CODE §40-73 (1950).
.-10. Aiuz. CODE ANN. § 56-1307 (Supp. 1952); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-908 (Supp.
1951); IowA CODE ANN. c. 736A, § 736A.7 (1950).
11. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 81-204 (1947) ; IOWA CODE ANN. c. 736A, § 736A.6 (1950);
Naa. REV. STAT. § 48-219 (Supp. 1951) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 11412.12 (Williams 1934).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11412.12 (Williams 1934). This enactment provides in
addition that "[e]ach day that any person, firm, corporation or association of any kind
remains in violation of any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed to be a separate
offense, punishable in accordance with the provisions of this section."
13. Section 9(e) (1) originally empowered the NLRB to hold an election to de-
termine whether a majority of employees in an appropriate unit desired a union-shop
provision in their employment contract.
14. 80 N.L.R.B. 288 (1948)."
15. Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana.
16. Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota.
17. Wisconsin.
18. This particular petition fully awakened the Board to the effects of multi-security
regulation. "The Employer in the instant case is directly engaged in the field of
transportation, and the nature of its operations is such that some of its employees,
particularly its drivers, continually travel between States which either permit without
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where the employees labored in 45 states and the District of Columbia,
the NLRB followed its Northland Greyhound Lines rule, stating "that
the headquarters of the employees provide the best criteria because they
represent the focal points of the employment relationship.", 9 The diffi-
culty with this mechanical approach appears in a finding of the Board that
the employees "are frequently transferred from one job location to
another in the same, or in a different, State."' 20  Presumably, a new
"headquarters" would be designated in every new area into which the
employee is transferred. If no new "headquarters" were assigned, the
employee could have a home office in a state which requires a two-thirds
majority vote to authorize a union shop or which prohibits all union-
security devices, yet he could perform work assignments in a state having
no union-security regulation whatsoever. 21
restriction, regulate, or prohibit union-shop agreements. It therefore becomes necessary
to determine initially which State law is applicable and then, in view of the language
of Section 14(b), whether the particular State law or the national law is paramount.
In resolving the question as to the applicable State law, such factors as the residences
of the employees, the places where they were hired, their headquarters, the proportions
of working time spent in the various States, and (with regard to the drivers), their
routes, have been given consideration. In view of all the circumstances involved, we are
persuaded that the headquarters of the employees provide the best criteria because they
represent the focal points of the employment relationship. The headquarters are where
the employees report to work, receive their instructions, and are paid their salaries. It
is, therefore, in the States in which they have their headquarters that the provisions
of any agreement between a union and an employer regarding the employees involved
will be effectuated. In view of the fact that most of the essential matters with respect
to the employment relationship will be dealt with in the States where the employees
have their headquarters, we believe that application of this test to determine which State
law shall control will result in the least amount of extra-territorial effect being given
to the laws of one State as against those of another." 80 N.L.R.B. 288, 291 (1948).
Less acute three-state problems arose in Giant Food Shopping Center, 77 N.L.R.B.
791 (1948), and American Viscose Corp., 23 LAB. EL. Rm,. (Ref. Man.) 1359 (1949).
In Giant Food Shopping Center, supra at 796, the Board decided (3-2) that "although
the unit appropriate for the purposes of Section 9(e) (1) in most instances will be
coextensive with the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining under
Section 9(a) . . . it need not be identical in all cases with such unit." In dissent,
Chairman Herzog warned "[t]his, I fear, may create more problems than it will
resolve. In shunning Scylla, we may fall into Charybdis." Id. at 799. The holding
of this case has been viewed dubiously by Congress. See Sm. REP. No. 99 Pt. 1, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1949).
19. 84 N.L.R.B. 1019, 1020 (1949), citing Northland Greyhound Lines, 80 N.L.R.B.
288 (1948).
20. 84 N:L.R.B. 1019, 1021 (1949). An estimate by the employer set the number of
such transfers during 1948 at 50,000. Ibid.
21. Indeed this contention was pressed on the Board by the employer who pointed
out that the employee "momentarily in a State outlawing the union-shop, may, after the
election, be transferred to a State which permits the union-shop, and thereupon become
subject to the terms of a union-shop contract, although he had no chance to vote on
the authorization of the contract. However, [the Board concluded], such an employee
would be in the same position as any citizen of a State who finds himself bound by
laws passed before his arrival there." 84 N.L.R.B. 1019, 1023 (1949).
While the Board's decision reached a practically expedient result, the individual
worker's rights sought to be protected by both state and federal statutes were sacrificed
NOTES
Since the repeal of Section 9(e) (1) the precise problem, adminis-
tration of security elections, confronting the NLRB in the preceding cases
is no longer encountered, but the chaotic situation described still exists
to confuse the status of union-security provisions in employment con-
tracts throughout the nation.
The incompatability of the state and federal security legislation
assumes the greatest significance in application of these laws to area-wide
bargaining units. The trucking industry vividly depicts the discordant
effects of non-uniform regulation. Over-the-road affiliates of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters negotiate employment contracts on
a multi-state basis. 22 In a representative group of contracts, each par-
ticipating area included both states which allow and those which prohibit
the conditioning of continued employment on the basis of union mem-
bership.2 3 These agreements disclose that employees receive such union-
security protection as is permitted by the laws of the states in which
they are domiciled. 24 Multifarious union-security laws portend serious
economic repercussions on both unions and their members in such situa-
tions. Since they need never join the union, which, as bargaining agent,
must represent them,25 employees domiciled in states outlawing union-
to provide a workable rule of thumb. Thus, the very statutes enacted to protect the
employee's interests and to encourage his participation in determination of employment
relation conditions actually prevent the protection they purport to guarantee.
22. Over-the-road affiliates connotes drivers of tractors and trailers for private,
common, and contract motor carriers.
23. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, supplied the INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL with contracts revealing this condition. Those states which prohibit or regulate
union security are italicized. Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, comprise a
collective bargaining area. Another area includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowoa, Kansas, Mich-
igan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Ohio. A third area encom-
passes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee.
24. The union-shop security provisions of these contracts contain the following
stipulations. "As respects employees domiciled in those states covered by this Agreement
in which required Union membership as a condition of employment is not prohibited
by law, the following [union-shop] clause shall be applicable ...
"The Employer in Texas and Arkansas agrees to give consideration to prospective
employees furnished through the employment facilities of the Union when the Employer
is in need of employees working in the various classifications covered by this agree-
ment. . . . Should the Texas Anti-Closed Shop Law which became effective on Septem-
ber 4, 1947, or the Arkansas Anti-Closed Shop Law which became effective on Feb-
ruary 19, 1947, be declared unconstitutional or unenforceable by a final judgment of a
court of last resort, the Company and the Union agree that Article II, Section 1
[union-shop provision], shall become effective immediately for Arkansas and/or Texas.
"The above [union-shop provision] . . . shall not . . . apply in any state where
prohibited by state law. If the [union-shop stipulation] hereof is invalid under the
law of any state wherein this contract is executed, it shall be modified to comply with
the requirement of state law or shall be renegotiated for the purposes of adequate
replacement." The Ford Motor Co. and United Auto Workers, CIO, contract also
contains a provision which renders the union-shop clause inoperative in states prohibiting
security measures. See 5 CCH LAB. LAW. REz,. (4th ed.) 153,160.009 (1952).
25. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
359
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security devices receive the identical benefits as the unionized workers.
Thus, in area-wide bargaining units, employees against whom union-shop
rules may be legally enforced bear the added burden of the "free-rid-
ers," 26 who occupy secure positions by virtue of the LMRA and re-
strictive state legislation.2 7
Union-employer agreements reflect attempts to reconcile collective
bargaining and multiplicate security regulation. There is evidence that
union and employer are confused by and wary of present state and federal
union-security restrictions. The parties insert elaborate clauses in the.
employment contract in an attempt to provide maximum security under
conflicting regulation and simultaneously prepare for possible invalidation
of state statutes.28  Several NLRB decisions have condemned security
provisions as improper under applicable state law.29
Congress was not without warning of certain ramifications of con-
current union-security regulation. 30  Legislation which completely pro-
26. To combat the "free-rider," the Central States Area contract provides: "In
those instances where the [union-shop] clause may not be validly applied, the Employer
agrees to recommend to all employees that they become members of the Union and
maintain such membership during the life of this Agreement, to refer new employees
to the Union representative, and to recommend to delinquent members that they pay
their dues since they are receiving the benefits of this contract." (emphasis added)
27. This factor undoubtedly retards the growth of unions in interdictive jurisdictions
because no worker wishes to pay the way of another by increased personal expenditures.
A second disadvantage not restricted to area-wide bargaining units is incurred by
unions in those states which prohibit utilization of security devices. Reconciliation of
union-management differences at the bargaining table necessitates concession of certain
demands asserted by each party. The process is not unlike a sale in which certain de-
mands are "sold," in return for which other demands are granted. Prohibition of
union security removes a valuable demand which, although it might not have been
granted, could have been "sold" for other substantial concessions.
28. See note 24 supra.
29. Green Bay Drop Forge Co., 29 LAE. REm. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1142 (1951). The
parties added these clauses to their contract: "The Union Security Provisions here
established shall be in effect when, and to the extent that, the applicable Federal and
State laws have been fully complied with.
"Any provision of this agreement which shall be in conflict with any Federal or
State law shall be and hereby is modified to conform to any State or Federal law." Id.
at 1143. This stipulation did not cure a failure to comply with the 30 day grace period
imposed by the Taft-Hartley Act on union-shop provisions in employment contracts.
In Hickey Cab Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 327, 329-330 (1950), the parties agreed to a
complex security provision and then annexed this stipulation: "If any provision of
this agreement is in violation of any Federal or Connecticut State Law, such provision
shall be inoperative to the extent only that such provision may be at variance therewith.'
But the NLRB declared that union-security provisions are effective until deemed invalid
by "the proper tribunal." Consequently, "[tihe very existence in the contract of the
union-security provision therefore acts as a restraint upon employees desiring to refrain
from union activities within the meaning of Section 7 of the [Taft-Hartley] Act."
This same conclusion was expounded in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1306
(1949) ; Evans Milling Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 391, 392-393 (1949) ; Unique Art Manufactur-
ing Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1252 (1949).
30. See 93 CONG. Rxc. 6456 (1947). Senator Morse cautioned: "Thus, we lay
down in the bill a very full and complete national policy as to closed- and union-shop
NOTES
hibits union-security devices has the tendency to weaken unions. In those
jurisdictions not restricting union security, unions can reasonably be
expected to flourish, at least comparatively. Weak unions cannot enforce
wage demands consonant with those of a secure, vigorous union; conse-
quently, wage rates reflect the power and skill of the union bargaining
for them. Skilled union leaders with faithful followers have consistently
won wage increases at the bargaining table. Labor costs in states which
do not regulate or do not severely restrict union-security measures will
increase; labor costs in states which forbid union-security methods will
remain at a relatively lower level. Employers engaged in business in
the former states whose labor costs constitute a large proportion of the
total product cost will discover that profit margins diminish, while com-
parable entrepreneurs in the latter jurisdictions will enjoy a competitive
advantage and expanding profit margins. Competitive goods at lower
prices will infiltrate the markets of the high-cost producer and capture
consumer demand by their more attractive price. In an effort to reduce
labor costs by weakening unions which represent their employees, em-
ployers in states not denying union security will urge adoption of laws
proscribing security. Uniform regulation precludes this condition and
the necessity for its extension.3 1 Important as these considerations may
agreements. At the same time, the bill provides in section 114] (b), however, that the
national policy may be entirely disregarded and superseded by the States if they desire
to impose a more restrictive policy on the same subject matter. A more.pointed instance
of antilabor bias could hardly be envisaged than this alleged minor change in the bill.
"Mr. President, we are dealing under a national policy with interstate commerce.
The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board is limited to interstate com-
merce cases and issues. But this amendment proposes that we except from the national
policy, as it relates to interstate commerce, national jurisdiction over these matters as
they involve the closed shops and union shops, in the case of any State which passes
an anticlosed shop or antiunion shop bilL The bill provides in effect that we allow
to employers in those States a State policy over interstate commerce contrary to a
national policy that we would apply through the National Labor Relations Board in
all other States which do not enact such State legislation.
"Mr. President, if anyone knows of a better example of unfair discrimination
than that, I should like to hear about it. I say that when it comes to interstate-commerce
policies, they should be uniform throughout the Nation, and we should not have a
national policy in regard to closed shops and union shops in States X, Y, and Z, but
then permit . . . a policy quite contrary to that policy under State laws in States
A, B, and C. Many employers will not like that, either, Mr. President, because that
has some interesting competitive implications connected with it, too. It will be rather
interesting, if this measure becomes law, to hear from some employers who, when
bound by the national policy, will come forward with allegations, and, I think, in
due course of time will prove, that such discriminatory practices result in some unfair
competitive factors for them in their competition with competitors in other States who
are able to function under a different policy." See also Hearings before Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare on S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1770 (1949).
31. Conflicting laws on union security are ominously significant in another appli-
cation restricted to intrastate commerce. Non-uniform state acts which impose various
degrees of restrictiveness represent supreme regulation of business enterprises not inter-
state in character. Jurisdictional boundaries of the NLRB have vaccilated over certain
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be,"' the significant effect of union-security prohibitions on collective
bargaining is revealed only by scrutiny of federal and state labor policies
and their ramifications.
portions of commerce so that amenability of the Board may include tomorrow what
today it rejects. Difficulty in determining the bargaining unit and administering elections
has made this circumstance necessary, even though it may be undesirable. SEN. REP.
No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-7 (1952) ; Hearings before Subcommittee on. Labor and
Labor Management Relations of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 1973,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 79-83 (1951). Also, conditions in certain other industries defy
application of present law. E.g., id. at 80.
A recent case, NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141, 143-144 (9th Cir. 1952),
prophesied the effects of incidence of those circumstances. The Board there assumed
jurisdiction over the building and construction industry contrary to the policy which
it followed two years previously when the company and the union executed a closed-
shop agreement. The union had not been certified as the employees' bargaining repre-
sentative by the NLRB, and, therefore, had no authority to enter such an arrangement
even though the closed shop was permitted under laws applicable at that time. The
Board declared the company guilty of an unfair labor practice because it had entered
a closed-shop agreement with the union. The court concluded that the facts did not
warrant the exercise of discretion and therefore labelled the Board's order "arbitrary,
capricious, and an abuse of discretion." Id. at 151. Thus, employment contracts con-
taining closed-shop stipulations which are valid under many states' laws may render
both employers and unions guilty of unfair practices if the shifting boundaries of NLRB
jurisdiction envelop other enterprises now considered beyond the Board's scope of
authority. The circuit court's judgment prevented injustice here, but nevertheless this
case warns that lack of uniformity may plague those industries now considered not
amenable to federal labor law. A realistic appraisal of labor relations justifies the
opinion that the inclusiveness of NLRB jurisdiction will continue to fluctuate, providing
fertile ground for similar litigation.
See NLRB v. Sterling Furniture Co., 21 U.S.L. WERK 2419 (March 3, 1953). "Since
the law of California does not prohibit union-shop or closed-shop arrangements, the
language of the Board's order is so broad as to prohibit activity of the union which
may be entirely lawful. The union says it has similar agreements with some 80 or 90
small establishments whose businesses do not affect interstate commerce. Moreover, in
borderline situations, the union cannot know until the Board or this court has spoken
whether its union-security agreements are valid or invalid, so it is required to proceed
more or less in terrorem or, as an alternative, to forego freedom of action which in good
faith it deems itself entitled to take." Ibid.
32. Labor relations scholars have not reached a unanimous opinion as to the
desirability of all forms of union security. One of the nation's authorities on union
security observed that "[f]rom labor's viewpoint, the closed shop is indispensable to
successful unionization." TONER, THE CLOSED SHOP 6 (1942). But an equally authorita-
tive scholar contends "[a] rule which would bar management's free access to the
employment market . . . may, properly be regarded as an impairment of an essential
management function." TELLER, MANAGEIENT FUNCTIONS UNDER COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 242 (1947). In arriving at their conclusions they consider, not incorrectly, the
patent effects of union security on day-to-day union-management collaboration. This
particular method of ascertaining the worth of security for the union permits observers
to list both advantages and disadvantages. Consequently, regardless of the ultimate
personal evaluation of the desirability of security, imposing substantiation of that judg-
ment can be made. It would be well to recognize that significant numbers and authorita-
tive members of management forces ally themselves with the proponents of union se-
curity. E.g., Hearings, supra note 30, at 2018; BRAUN, THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND ITS
LIMITS 191 (1950) ; TAYLOR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSRIAL RELATIONS 63-65
(1948); Jansen, The Closed Shop Is Not a Closed Issue, 2 IND. AND LAB. REL. Rxv.
546 (1949).
Champions of union security contend that a secure labor organization cooperates
NOTES
The Right to Work
That Congress failed to respond to such cogent arguments against
the union-security provisions of the LMRA indicates that a consideration
far more compelling than possible detrimental economic ramifications
made passage of Section 14(b) imperative. This overriding factor can
be detected in Senator Taft's contention that "either we should have an
open shop or we should have an open union."33 Previously the Senator
had stated: ". . apparently they [union members] feel that today
they are at a great disadvantage in dealing with union leaders, and that
willingly with management because of assured existence. The union need not contest
every exercise of employer discretion since no such exercise can cause discrimination
due to union affiliation. Both union and management mutually attempt to improve
efficiency to meet competition from non-organized and low-cost plants. When an entire
industry has been organized and the union secures uniform wage rates, labor costs
cease to be a competitive factor, thus permitting concentration of effort on improved pro-
duction and distribution; the union can effectively "police" this form of industry-wide
agreement. Union demands on management moderate with the realization that both
parties have secured interests in the continuation of the business enterprise. Workers'
interest and efficiency increase because they have no fear of arbitrary dismissals; and
union discipline is more effective, thereby creating a more responsible labor organization.
All of these effects tend to produce stable costs and production rates permitting accurate
estimates of future expenditures and completion dates. All employees contribute to the
union's support, eliminating the "free rider," and of course, jurisdictional disputes are
impossible so long as the security provision remains in force.
Disparagers of union security claim that labor leaders tend to make unreasonable
demands when employment contracts include security provisions. Labor costs rise
because of increased, more enforceable union demands, and higher costs decrease the
profit margin thus forcing high cost enterprises out of business. Worker efficiency is
impaired because the employee, aware of his secure position, lacks incentive to do well.
Unions exercise dictatorial power over workers, and consequently the organized laborer
owes allegiance to the union and shop steward instead of to employer and foreman.
Fairness to critics of union security requires the observation that -few labor-
relations authorities favor abolition of all security devices. SLicHTER, UNION PoLIcIEs
AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 96 (1941) ; TEL.a, op. cit. supra, at 240-241. Disagree-
ment occurs over the particular form of provisions to be utilized to acquire security,
not whether all security should be abolished. Respected scholars propose complete
abandonment of the closed shop but assert the merits of retaining the union shop. The
distinction is significant because it reveals that union security per se is not undesirable;
in fact, many of their criticisms pertain uniquely to the closed shop. They contend that
management's hiring prerogative is obstructed because non-union applicants cannot be
considered for employment. Since available labor supply bulks no greater than union
membership, union forces inadequate to furnish the employer's needs tend to increase
wage rates, hours of overtime, and production costs. Management can be compelled to
select less desirable workers. Furthermore, union membership as a prerequisite to
employment antagonizes popular concepts of freedom and the right to work.
The manifest effects of existing laws pertaining to union security provide no
definite criterion by which to judge the value of present statutes notwithstanding the
confusion and inconvenience they cause. In the discussion thus far the desirability of
secure unions is moot; obviously then, no proper conclusion can be formed about the
suitability of right-to-work laws which prohibit security. Consideration of the desirability
of retaining present laws in light of the arguments for and against union security
reveals that mere examination and comparison of advantages and disadvantages of
union security affords no justifiable basis to condemn existing statutes.
33. 93 CONG. REc. 3837 (1947).
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the power given to the leaders by existing legislation is so great that the
individual is unable to exercise [his] right to free speech, his right to
work as he pleases, and [his] general right to live as he pleases."'34
(emphasis added)
Compulsion in whatever form cannot easily be reconciled with pop-
ular American views of freedom and liberty. While this basic tenet of
democratic society does not admit of precise delineation, a free people
almost without exception abhor being compelled to do something. It is,
therefore, understandable that many reject the contention that mandatory
union membership is consistent with traditional notions of individual
freedom. 35 ' Nor is it surprising that "the right to work" has received a
considerable amount of academic attention, as well as avid public
support.3 6
The right to work can be protected in two ways. Unions may be
required to admit and retain all those who desire employment within
their "jurisdiction," or employers may be ordered to employ applicants
and retain workers without regard to their union status. The former
is the open union; the latter is the open shop.3 7 There is a vast distinction
between the two methods. The closed-shop interdict imposed by the Act
and the complete prohibition of security devices by various state statutes
reveal that both Congress and state legislature selected, although not com-
pletely, the latter of Senator Taft's alternatives. To enforce the right to
work they decided to restrict union security rather than to provide for
the open union.38 Congress rejected the open-union approach purportedly
34. Id. at 3835. Senator Taft also stated: "Even on the question of the closed
shop, which the union leaders are most vigorously defending, the polls show that more
than half their men are actually opposed to the position the leaders are taking. ... "
Ibid. Experience refuted the Senator's statements. Of the 44,587 union-shop elections
conducted prior to discontinuance in 1951, the union shop was the workers' choice in
977 of the elections. 73 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 682 (1951).
35. The great surge of antipathy for union control of job opportunities has been
of recent origin. Of the thirteen states which completely prohibit all forms of security,
ten states enacted such legislation in 1947, one state in 1945, one in 1944. Nevada
approved an interdictive constitutional amendment in 1952. Many states rejected similar
legislation during the same period.
36. Other related topics, the right to join a union and admission and expulsion
policies of unions, have been discussed, too. Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47
COL. L. tZv. 33 (1947) ; Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. AND LAB. REL.
REv. 483 (1950); Summers, Admission Policies of Labor Unions, 61 Q.J. EcoN. 66
(1946).
. 37. For an examination of the problems encountered by attempting to enforce an
open-union policy see Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COL. L. REV. 33, 36
(1947).
38. "Confronted with the wealth of evidence on the abuses of individual and
minority rights under closed-shop contracts, the framers of the Taft-Hartley Act faced
the dilemma of either prohibiting the closed shop and protecting individual rights under
other forms of compulsory membership in unions, such as the union shop, or else
writing an elaborate statute protecting the rights of individual members of unions
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in order to avoid governmental interference with internal activities of
unions, although it could be argued that the LMRA does in fact regulate
internal union affairs to some extent.
It is thus apparent that any pertinent inquiry into the propriety of
existing federal and state union-security laws must include an examina-
tion of their effectiveness in guaranteeing the right to work. A failure
toachieve this proclaimed purpose coupled with any harmful effects on
collective bargaining which might be incurred as a result of concurrent
federal-state regulation of union security would indicate that there is
little justification for such legislation as it now exists.
"" The number of reported instances in which unions have denied
admission to applicants is small.39 Nor do litigated unreasonable expul-
sions from union membership occur often.40 The total number of such
incidents cannot be precisely determined, however, because many cases
are tried in courts whose decisions 'are not reported. Many rejected
applicants for union membership probably lack the financial resources
necessary to litigate their alleged causes of action. But as a practical
matter, unions maintain their effectiveness by controlling labor forces;
therefore, wholesale rejection of membership-aspiring workers would
tend to diminish union strength and power. No union would long adhere
to such a policy. It must be remembered that unions have assumed
against arbitrary or capricious expulsion. The solution of the dilemma was to reject the
idea of having the Federal Government interfere and police the internal activities of
unions." H.R. REP. No. 317 Pt. 2, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1949). Nevertheless, Con-
gress has given serious consideration to proposals regulating internal union affairs. See
Aaron and Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44 ILL. L. Ray.
425, 631 (1949).
"H.R. 3020, as passed by the House, listed a number of union unfair labor practices
relating to the conduct of union internal affairs; but these were stricken from the version
of the bill passed by the Senate." Id. at 447 n.102. As the authors point out, the
Labor Management Relations Act does actually impose some restrictions on union
internal affairs. Id. at 447-451.
Three proposals have been presented to Congress purporting to regulate internal
affairs of unions. One bill elaborately lists ten union unfair labor practices. Generally
the provisions of all the bills attempt to protect the union member from unreasonable
and arbitrary union action. Id. at 636-649.
39. Summers, Admission Policies of Labor Unions, 61 Q.J. Eco N. 66, 67 (1946).
The relatively small number of unreasonable refusals to admit workers to union mem-
bership are so contrary to common views of justice and democracy that no condemna-
tion seems too vehement. Any number of such incidents, no matter how few, is too many.
"It is impossible to determine precisely to what extent the various 75,000 local
unions close their membership books, for no systematic study has yet been made. A
few horrible examples, such as Local 110 of the Motion Picture Operators in Chicago
refusing to accept any new members for 15 years, have been widely publicized, but it
is generally agreed that there are relatively few unions which engage in this practice."
Id. at 79.
40. The frequency of reported unjustified dismissals has been determined as less
than four per year. Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Union, 3 IND. AND LAB. REL. REV.
483, 487 (1950).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
responsibility for the conduct of their members; proper execution of the
duties imposed by that responsibility necessitates powers of control and
censure over members. The most effective element of control lies in the
organization's ability to terminate the workers' employment by with-
drawal of their union membership. Of course, this cannot be accom-
plished unless union affiliation is a condition of employment and unless
members can be expelled for unreasonable conduct. Present law prohibits
the employer from dismissing a worker under a union-shop agreement if
the cause of termination of union membership is other than a failure
to pay union fees and dues. 41 Since many employment contracts provide
for automatic check-off if the worker supplies the employer with a written
authorization, a great number of organized employees are legally immune
to union discipline. 42 Employees laboring under a union-shop contract
with no check-off provision would seldom fail to pay dues if to do so
would result in dismissal from employment.
The particular mode adopted by Congress to protect employment
rights has proved extremely difficult to enforce. Notwithstanding pro-
scription of the closed shop, it still exists in many employment re-
lationships. 43 Those industries which utilized the hiring hall prior to
Taft-Hartley continue that practice,44 and undoubtedly many employers
continue to hire only organized workers by custom or, perhaps, to culti-
vate the union's good will. Gentlemen's agreements not only achieve
the precise practical effect of formal contracts, but make detection of
improper relationships almost impossible. Strict closed-shop agreements
can flourish because neither party to the illegal agreement will likely
reveal its provisions.
41. § 8(a) (3) (B).
42. An analysis of 602 contracts revealed that 72% of them contained check-off
provisions. 13 CONFERENCE BOARD MANAGEMENT REcoRD 352-353 (1951).
43. "The NLRB has been consistent in throwing out contracts that require union
membership as a condition of employment. But despite the [B]oard and the law of
the land, the closed shop in some form has continued to thrive in several sectors of
the economy. . . . [S]ome equivalent of the closed shop is common in printing, long-
shore, maritime, building, clothing, and trucking among others." Fortune, Sept. 1951,
p. 62.
"The exact number of bootleg (i.e., verbal) closed-shop agreements is unknown,
but the NLRB believes them to be on the rise. It is actually a moot question whether
more or fewer workers are under closed-shop conditions since Taft-Hartley." Id. at
64. See also SEN. REP. No. 99 Pt. 1, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1949); SEN. REP. No.
374, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1949) ; Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49
MICH. L. REv. 805, 807 n.5 (1951).
See United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers & Steamfitters v. Graham, 73 Sup. Ct.
585, 588 n.5 (1953).
44. E.g., Hearings before Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of Cons-
inittee on Labor ,.nd Public Welfare on Hiring Halls in the Maritime Industry, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). It has been conceded that the hiring hall is merely a form of
the closed shop. Id. at 7.
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While the LMRA does not purport to regulate union admission and
expulsion practices, it prohibits dismissal from employment of paid up
workers notwithstanding their hostility toward the union. This mandate
produces a peculiar anomaly. Heretofore, governmental policy encour-
aged union membership and worker participation in determination of
employment terms. In effect, the federal government sponsored a pro-
gram of industrial democracy by urging the employee to cast his vote in
union proceedings and thereby share in prescribing employment rela-
tionship provisions. But the Taft-Hartley Act informs the worker that
he need not actively participate in the union. In fact, the worker owes
no allegiance to the union save monetary contribution because only for
failure to pay dues can the union legally demand dismissal from em-
ployment.
Congressional and state legislation outwardly encourages union
development but simultaneously denies union security in an effort to shield
job opportunities from abusive union membership practices. Yet clearly,
the measures adopted to protect the right to work neither admit of
effective enforcement nor further the aim of industrial democracy.
Therefore, since they fail to accomplish their intended purpose, if laws
prohibiting union security impose any substantial detriment on other
desirable policies, their retention cannot be tolerated.45
Intelligent appraisal of the security dilemma constrains reflection
on the importance of collective bargaining and the latent effects of
present statutes on the bargaining process.
The Function of Union Security in Collective Bargaining
Federal law declares that collective bargaining shall characterize
labor-management relations.46 There is but a single function of the
45. More extensive treatment of the topics, protection of the right to work and
right to join a union, lies beyond the contemplation of this note. They have been
extensively examined in other discussions. E.g., Lenhoff, The Right to Work: Here
and Abroad, 46 ILL. L. REv. 669 (1951) ; Summers, supra note 36.
46. "It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining. . . ." § 1. This portion of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act's declaration of policy has remained unchanged since enactment in 1935. It
is interesting to note the emphasis placed on collective bargaining by Taft-Hartley.
Employees receive the assurance that they "shall have the right to ... bargain col-
lectively. . . ." § 7. The employer is admonished that he commits an unfair labor
practice by refusal "to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees ......
§ 8(a)(5). Similarly, the union is warned not "to refuse to bargain collectively with
an employer.. .. " § 8(b) (3).
Popularly and superficially the bargaining process is restricted to negotiation of
and agreement to employment contract provisions. That is a significant portion of
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bargaining process: Resolution of labor-management controversies. All
other accomplishments are complementary attributes of that process,
rather than distinct functions. Some persons tend to regard bargaining
as a cure-all which should invariably solve even the most acute disagree-
ments without resort to strikes or other forms of economic coercion.4 7
Indeed, proponents of collective bargaining concede that often the threat
of such coercion promotes effectiveness in the bargaining process and
expedites resolution of disagreements. 48  Collective bargaining embraces
the possibility of coercion not as a bludgeon, but as a result of failure
to resolve disagreements by cooperation.
Although collective bargaining does not guarantee perfect labor-
management relations, 49 the undesirability of alternative approaches
to resolution of employer-employee differences, governmental inaction
or governmental regulation, justifies tolerance of the bargaining
process. Governmental inaction produced the conditions prevalent previ-
ous to adoption of the National Labor Relations Act.50 Reversion to that
environment would merely re-create an industrial economy with no place
for unions or union-management relations and, consequently, no hope for
effective collective bargaining. Congressional regulation of industrial
collective bargaining practice and procedure, but the written agreement composed by
union and management negotiators also creates the future rights and responsibilities of
the parties to that agreement. Occurrences previous and subsequent to the formally
executed contract constitute integral elements of collective bargaining and often exceed
the agreement itself in significance.
47. Section 7 of the LMRA specifically affirms the employee's right to engage in
"concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ... "
48. "A right to engage in industrial warfare is essential to the cause of industrial
peace under the collective-bargaining system." TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 32, at 22.
49. Collective bargaining affords an imperfect process by which to solve union and
management differences. Too often imperfection results from a lack of appreciation
for the other party's position and circumstances. Not seldom the parties submit ulti-
matums which reveal no contemplation of the ramifications which their selfish desires
impose on the public interest.
50. Prior to 1935 the federal government expressed no policy pertaining to
negotiations or attempted negotiations between the employee or his representative and
the employer. Of course, collective bargaining presupposes an employee representative
with whom the employer can deal, but several factors made governmentally unencour-
aged bargaining improbable because unions' efforts to gain recognition as the employees'
representative generally failed. Few employers welcomed unions into their employment
relationship. Management developed several devices by which to impede union infiltra-
tion into working forces such as the company spy, yellow dog contract, and black list.
Society shared management's unfavorable view of organized labor to no little extent,
perhaps because unions relied on the strike to gain recognition (no other device
sufficed). At times the strike degenerated into a pitched battle of violence, loss of life,
and destruction of property necessitating use of the militia to restore order. Of course,
unfavorable publicity followed. And too, courts justifiably deemed themselves obli-
gated to protect life and property but often issued injunctive decrees which afforded the
prayed for protection and, as well, sounded the death knell for organizational endeavors
of the employee.
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relations would obviate private negotiation and stifle voluntary coopera-
tion and incentive. No advantage or recompense could accrue from col-
lective bargaining because legislation would dogmatically resolve disagree-
ments by mandate. Issues which now are resolyed by bargaining would
become controversies in political campaigns. But failure of the bar-
gaining process to resolve disagreements between union and management
will inevitably necessitate substitution of governmental mandate for
private negotiation. The undesirability of legislatively pre-determined
labor relations warrants utilization of every justifiable means to insure the
effectiveness of collective bargaining.
Successful collective bargaining basically requires both a suitable
environment and union and management personnel who share a proper
state of mind. These seemingly easily supplied prerequisites have not yet
been attained. The Wagner Act was based on the premise that when an
environment conducive to negotiation had been supplied the parties would
resolve their differences by the bargaining process.6 ' That this result
did not follow was largely due to the fact that the parties exhibited
neither the reciprocal consideration and understanding of the other party's
position nor an appreciation of the public's interest in peaceful resolution
of labor controversies. Fortunately, Congress, in passing the Wagner
Act, apprehended that proper bargaining attitudes could not be created
by legislation. Unfortunately, in the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress sought
to substitute regulation of collective bargaining for the deficiency of
proper attitudes. 2 While attainment of proper bargaining attitudes
51. Advocates of collective bargaining promulgated the notion that a balance of
power between union and management would propitiate their differences. Unfortunately,
the balance of power ideology found no more success in labor relations than in inter-
national relations. Perhaps this arrangement could have effected complete attainment of
congressional intent to assure successful private negotiation of differences but for the
philosophy that the parties gathered at the bargaining table as essential preparation for
disagreement. This philosophy injected bellicose attributes into collective bargaining
and prepared union and employer for an economic conflict and display of stamina.
Admittedly not all attempts to bargain resolved themselves in this manner, but many
did and often in industries with which the public interest was inextricably involved.
The schism between this practice and the sought for successful private negotiation
procedure widened until remonstrance made alteration imperative because unions abused
their power which now often exceeded that of the employer.
In November, 1945, a Labor-Management Conference was convened to afford all
interested parties an opportunity to resolve controversies and determine plausible
courses of action for future labor relations. The Conference was not without success,
but it fell far short of evolving a workable procedure by which to insure peaceful union-
management relations. For an extensive analysis of this step in the development of
union-management collaboration see TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 32, at 205-244.
52. The LMRA reveals a mutation of government policy, from the premise that
union and management can better resolve all issues of the employment relationship by
private negotiation to the notion that some facets of the relationship (e.g., union
security) can more appropriately be determined by mandate.
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depends largely upon the parties involved, creation of an atmosphere
conducive to that end rests with Congress.5 3
Recognition of the union as the representative of the employees
essentially precedes all bargaining relations. The Taft-Hartley Act, as
did the Wagner Act, provides for union-recognition elections, 54 thus
precluding the necessity for recognition strikes which were prevalent prior
to federal encouragement of collective bargaining. 55 The employer com-
mits an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with an NLRB
certified union.56 The employees possess authority to decertify their
union bargaining representative by election.57  This power presumably
assures that the union will remain responsive to employee demands and
needs. Manifestly, union conduct is directed toward perpetuation of
recognized status, for without it the union has no collective bargaining
utility. Comprehension of this phenomenon explains union efforts to
secure a permanently recognized position in industrial government. Any-
thing which threatens a union's recognition jeopardizes its existence and,
because bargaining requires a union, threatens the very process of col-
lective bargaining.
Subsequent to enactment of the Wagner Act, union security sup-
planted union recognition as the primary goal of the labor movement.
53. Note well the paradox which Congress effectuated. Collective bargaining,
which presumed that private negotiation can better solve labor-management discord
than can governmental fiat, underwent direct statutory regulation. Union and management
cannot obey statutory decrees to negotiate freely when subsequent decrees prohibit
bargaining for certain employment provisions. Section 302, regulation of welfare
funds, constitutes an excellent example of governmental control of heretofore privately
determined stipulations. If collective bargaining affords a superior process for settle-
ment of employee-employer conflicts, full support should be accorded that process;
but if statutory determination contributes better results, resort to that method should
prevail. Current practice attempts to combine both procedures with remarkable un-
satisfactoriness.
France has recently begun a return from governmentally regimented labor rela-
tions to free collective bargaining. Sturmthal, Collective Bargaining in France, 4 Ia.
AND LAB. RE. REv. 236 (1951).
54. Section 9(c) of the Wagner Act and §9(c)(1) of the Taft-Hartley Act
designate the election process.
55. There can be no collective bargaining if the employees have no representative
with which management can negotiate. Pre-Wagner Act union-management relations
did not often develop into a bargaining process because the employer seldom recognized
the union as the representative of his employees. If the union had not the allegiance of
sufficient workers, the employer would be picketed to gain employee support and to
induce the employer to acknowledge the union. When the employees were already faith-
fully organized, a recognition strike endeavored to persuade the employer that the
union represented his workers. Neither contributed consistent success as is evidenced
by membership ,in the American Federation of Labor which never rose as high as three
million members at any time during the period 1923 to 1932. Source of membership
data: 37 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 1128 (1933).
56. § 8(a) (5). Before certification of the union as bargaining representative, it must
receive approval by the majority of workers in the unit. § 9.
57. §9(e)(2).
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Unions desire security because it means control of job opportunities, but,
of even larger significance, union security performs functions essential
to the effectiveness of collective bargaining. Union security devices pro-
vide the only means by which the union can achieve continued recogni-
tion, which is, of course, a prerequisite to collective bargaining. Thus,
union security has a dual function indispensable to collective bargaining:
It promotes acquisition of proper bargaining attitudes, and it guarantees
recognition of the union throughout the employment contract period.
Realization of the effects of state prohibition of union security on
federal collective bargaining policy clothes such legislation with a far
deeper significance than mere disruptive influences which naturally ensue
as a result of state divergence from congressional policy. Concurrent
state and federal union-security regulation does not directly cause cur-
rent deplorable industrial conditions. But, present laws hamper efforts
to eliminate these conditions by collective bargaining. Though the dis-
tinction may seem narrow, the consequences which flow from it are broad.
State laws which deny unions the use of security measures compel
retrogression of union-management relations to conditions corresponding
to the pre-Wagner Act environment. By prohibiting union security, the
states compel unions to resort to protection of their recognized bargaining
status through picketing and strikes. Furthermore, in jurisdictions per-
mitting union-security agreements, collective bargaining receives encour-
agement because unions can more easily maintain a recognized status,
whereas in states prohibiting such devices, union-management relations
reflect an unstable union position and consequent obstruction of collective
bargaining. 58
Federal union-security policy depicts a unique departure from con-
ventional congressional action. Rarely does Congress designate a par-
ticular national policy and simultaneously encourage the states to legis-
late so as to impair its effectuation. The practical effect of Section 14(b)
of LMRA is congressional authorization of state sabotage of federal
collective bargaining policy. Yet recent developments indicate that Con-
gress is aggravating the union-security conflict.
Recent Legislative Developments
The building and construction industry, because of the peculiar
intermittent nature of its production process, could not adjust to the
LMRA union-security requirements. Employees do not often remain in
the employ of one contractor for the 30-day period necessary to make
58. For an examination of the economic repercussions of this condition by Senator
Morse see note 30 supra.
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union affiliation mandatory. More important, this same condition ren-
ders certification of a union as a recognized bargaining representative
impossible, because the work force rarely becomes sufficiently stabilized
to warrant an NLRB certification election. Senate Bill 1973 was intro-
duced to alleviate this condition by exempting the building and-con-
struction industry from the operation of Section 14(b). 59 Although the
bill was approved by the Senate, adjournment prevented action by the
House of Representatives. It is problematical whether the Eighty-third
Congress will enact this legislation, but if passed, it would add another
discriminatory provision to federal union-security regulation.60 Congress
will have displayed partiality to the building and construction industry
in its attempt to compensate for a defect in previous legislation if this
proposal becomes law. 1
Conditions in the building and construction industry warrant
remedial legislation, but antagonization of the union-security problem is
implicit in the proposed act. If the House of Representatives had con-
curred with the Senate, the scope of discrimination would have been
broadened from that invoked by the states to that of federal partiality
for a certain industry as well.6 2 Members of building and construction
59. The portion of S. 1973 pertinent here would attach this proviso to § 9(a) of
LAMRA: "Provided further, That nothing in this section or any other section of this
act or of any other statute or law of the United States or of anty State or Territory
[emphasis added] shall preclude an employer primarily engaged in the building and
construction industry from making an agreement . . . to require, as a condition of
employment, membership in such [union] organization on or after the seventh day
following the beginning of such employment .. " 98 CONG. REc. 5109 (May 12, 1952).
60. The Railway Labor Act has been amended so as to immunize the railway
brotherhoods from state union-security bans. 64 STAT. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152
(Supp. 1952). While'the Railway Labor Act amendment is equally discriminatory, the
railroad industry and its unions have long been the subject of special legislation. For
that reason, exemption of the railway unions will probably not have the same effects
as S. 1973 would have if it became law.
61. There can be no doubt that the proposed amendment is intended to overrule
§ 14(b). Acting Chairman Reynolds of the NLRB inquired of the legislators: "Would
this language, then, have the effect of overriding State law as to union-security agree-
ments in this one industry?" Senator Humphrey, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Labor and Labor-Management Relations, rejoined: "Well, it would seem to me that that
word 'nothing' is rather all-inclusive and comprehensive. I think we could define that
word. That means that section 14, so far as this is concerned, is kaput. It is out."
Hearings, supra note 31, at 74. See also SEN. REP. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1952).
62. Some Congressmen are aware of the situation created by concurrent union-
security restriction. See note 30 supra. In a discussion concerning the efficacy of
§ 14(b) under another bill, Senator Humphrey uttered this judgment of concurrent
security regulation: "Of course, I think that is a sort of distortion on Federal
jurisdiction. ...
"I cannot understand how the United States can legislate in a field in which it
declares it has no prerogative to legislate, and can then play footsie and say, 'If North
Carolina wants to pass a law regarding union security, the Congress will just retreat.'
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unions would be permitted to enjoy the security and benefits of a union
shop in every state; but other workers and unions would remain subject
to the ramifications of Section 14(b).
The influence of S. 1973 cannot be appraised precisely, but the ap-
parent injustice could be expected to impair collective bargaining in
industries not granted special exemption from state laws. Union leaders
will quickly comprehend that a failure of the bargaining process nearly
brought nation-wide union security to the building and construction trade.
They may reason that similar failure in another industry might well
make more special relief essential. 3 The Senate has merely rewarded
an industry which could not bargain under the restrictions imposed by
Section 14(b). Workers and unions may sincerely doubt the good faith
of Congress when statutes deny them privileges granted to others,
privileges obtained by unsuccessful attempts to bargain. 64 There is little
incentive to bargain when greater benefits accrue to those who do not.
When failure of collective bargaining commands a premium in the form
of special legislative treatment, failure will be commonplace. More un-
favorable publicity for collective bargaining shall weaken already skep-
tical public faith in the bargaining process. And still, Congress depends
on the success of collective bargaining to solve union-management discord.
Since collective bargaining seems the most desirable process by which
to resolve industrial conflict, the importance of assuring its success cannot
be over-emphasized. Congressional labor legislation must encourage the
That is just the candid opinion of one member of the committee." Hearings, supra
note 31, at 75.
63. While testifying before a Senate Subcommittee on Labor, the Acting Chair-
man of the NLRB answered a question as to the effect of all S. 1973 provisions on the
long range stability of the construction industry with this admonition: "I think that if
the Congress sees fit to make an exception of the building-construction industry, you
are going to have the same request before you to make exceptions of a number of other
industries." Id. at 80.
The Acting Chairman forewarned: "The problems which have been confronted in
this industry are also confronted in the application of the Taft-Hartley law to the
maritime industry. They are confronted to a great extent in the motion-picture in-
dustry...
"And in the television industry, a new industry, also....
"These problems of the building construction industry are tremendous. There
isn't any question about it. But they are also tremendous in a number of other in-
dustries. And I am just rather concerned that the Congress will be met with a request
to exempt other industries as you go along." Ibid. The motion-picture industry did
plead its case before the Subcommittee.' Yd. at 106.
64. Note how applicable the following excerpt is to all other industries, as well as
the building and construction industry. "The needs of contractors, labor organizations,
and employees in this industry are the same throughout the country. Failure to meet
these needs have resulted in problems which are Nation-wide and indivisible. Their
impact upon the national economy, and especially upon defense activities, does not 'Vary
from State to State." (emphasis added) SEN. REP. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1952).
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practice and development of bargaining and, correlatively, must remove
obstacles which impede, as well as prohibit, fruition of federal labor
policy. Union security has an essential function to perform before labor
and management can acquire continued successful collective bargaining.
Congress undermines every effort to promote effective bargaining by
endorsing provisions which permit state prohibition of union security.
Repeal of Section 14(b) is imperative. It should be replaced with
a stipulation denying validity to state action more restrictive than federal
union-security regulation. National uniform policy would prevent state
obstruction of collective bargaining. Purely local bias could not impair
or destroy the expressed will of the nation. Problems encountered in
modem interstate commerce require solution on a country-wide basis,
and collective bargaining represents a national solution to national labor-
management problems. Interference by the states cannot be tolerated if
effective private negotiation is the goal of federal labor legislation.
Congressional apprehension of the serious impairment administered
collective bargaining by encouragement of anomalous state prohibitions
of union security will surely incite legislative remedy of this labor law
paradox. Uniform state laws could produce a partially adequate remedy.
But even if the states would agree to repeal their right-to-work provisions,
which is not likely, the time essential for individual state action warrants
rejection of this possibility. 65 Congress should enact the proposed remedy
immediately. Realistic solution of national labor problems requires a
foundation of uniform union-security legislation.
VOLUNTARY FALSE CONFESSIONS: A NEGLECTED
AREA IN CRIMINAL ADMINISTRATION
Exclusionary rules relating to criminal confessions find their basis
in a single premise, insulation of the adversary system of jurisprudence
from introduction of false and unreliable evidence. Such false testimony,
when undetected, can only result in a fraud upon society-conviction
of the innocent and freedom for the guilty.' Justifiable concern is ex-
65. Such a remedy would only be partially adequate because judicial interpretation
commonly destroys the uniformity of identical statutes.
1. "There has been no careful collection of the statistics of untrue confessions, nor
has any great number of instances ever been loosely reported, but enough have been
verified to fortify the conclusion, based on ordinary observation of human conduct, that
under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective mentality or peculiar
temperament, may falsely acknowledge guilt." 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed.
1940).
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pressed over the plight of the innocent individual incarcerated for com-
mitting a crime. Not only does an innocent person suffer needlessly, but
society, in whose name criminals are apprehended and punished, bears
the brunt of any additional transgressions the actual guilty party may
perpetrate. Where murder or rape is the crime, the enormity of the error
and its adverse consequences cannot be gainsaid.
In efforts to forestall such distasteful results, the law has provided
safeguards against confessions resulting from "involuntary" stimuli, but
instances where an innocent party has "voluntarily" professed guilt have
not been the subject of similar consideration. An awareness of the
problem and suggestions for remedies must precede more detailed ap-
praisal of potential measures designed to alleviate inadequacies in present
administration of the law.
I
Lack of sufficient recognition of the false confession problem by
law enforcement officials and by courts has resulted in numerous ques-
tionable convictions. A notable illustration high-lighting the tangled
factual skein characterizing this area is the Lobaugh-Christen-Click
series of cases in Indiana. Subsequent to the murder of four women
in 1944 and 1945 in the Ft. Wayne area, Lobaugh formally confessed to
the murders of Miss Haaga, Miss Kuzeff, and Miss Howard. Initially
he denied his guilt in the slaying of Miss Conine.' Following frequent
repudiations and reaffirmances of his confessions he pleaded guilty to
three counts of murder. He was convicted and sentenced to death. When
city officials later expressed doubt as to Lobaugh's guilt, Christen, a
known molester of women, was arrested and charged with the murder
of Miss Howard. He too was convicted and sentenced to death-thus
two persons were awaiting execution for Miss Howard's death.
Although defendant Christen was later freed when his appeal was
successful,3 the supply of culprits was not yet depleted. Click, turned
over to the police by his wife, admitted killing Miss Haaga, Miss Kuzeff,
and Miss Conine.4 Despite repudiation of his confession, and a letter
from Lobaugh admitting guilt in all four murders,5 Click was convicted
2. It has been claimed that police attempted to persuade him to confess to this
murder, informing him that the penalty would be no greater for four murders than
for three. Communication to the INDIANA LAW JouRNAL from the Ft. Wayne News
Sentinel.
3. Christen v. State, 228 Ind. 30, 89 N.F.2d 445 (1950).
4. It was later claimed by Click that this was done to collect the outstanding
reward money. Reply Brief for Appellant, pp. 41, 42, Click v. State, 228 Ind. 644, 94
N.E.2d 919 (1950).
5. Id. at 12.
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and sentenced to the electric chair for the murder of Miss Conine.6 He
was executed. In the meantime the Governor commuted Lobaugh's sen-
tence to life imprisonment.7 Discovery of the crime for which he is
serving occasions no small perplexity."
The consequences of the state's diligence in this case present mute
testimony to the significance of false confessions: One man was executed
and another is still serving a life sentence for commission of a crime to
which both had confessed, while a third, initially convicted of one of the
crimes, was freed only because inadequate circumstantial evidence con-
stituted the basis of his conviction.
II
Only partial accuracy rewards attempts to enumerate the motives for
falsely confessing to a crime. 9 Even the most complete analysis relegates
6. Conviction upheld on appeal. Click v. State, 228 Ind. 644, 94 N.E.2d 919 (1950).
7. "Grave doubt about Lobaugh's guilt has always been entertained by many of
the officers working on these cases but all of them looked upon him as a neurotic and
wholly unfit for human society. That he was a sex pervert has been definitely estab-
lished." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from ex-Governor Henry F.
Schricker.
8. Ultimately Lobaugh confessed to all four murders and Click admitted killing
all of the women except Miss Howard. On appeal of the Click conviction for the murder
of Miss Conine, the supreme court stated: "Of course, it is true the confession of
Lobaugh and that of appellant cannot both be true. By his ruling on the motion for
new trial, the trial court has determined the appellant's confession is of such probity,
that the Lobaugh confession would not prevail against it should a new trial be had."
Click v. State, 228 Ind. 644, 653, 94 N.E.2d 919, 923 (1950). Thus the acceptance by
the trial court of the Click confession to the Conine murder casts doubt upon the
validity of Lobaugh's confession to the Haaga and Kuzeff murders since Click also
confessed to them. Moreover, lie detector and truth serum tests indicated Lobaugh was
truthful in stating he had not committed these three crimes. (In all fairness it must
be added that some lie detector tests showed he was telling the truth in admitting his
guilt to all three of the crimes.) From the above one could reasonably conjecture that
Lobaugh was guilty of the Howard slaying only. This case is confused, however, since
the evidence that Lobaugh killed Miss Howard was practically identical with that later
used to convict Christen for the same murder; the two important differences were that
(1) the one witness who could identify the civilian with the victim prior to her death
stated that Lobaugh was not the man, while he testified on the stand in Christen's trial
that Christen was the man and (2) Lobaugh confessed to the crime and Christen did
not. Yet the Christen conviction for the murder of Miss Howard was reversed because
the supreme court felt that there was no evidence from which an inference of guilt
could be drawn. The presence of the civilian in the alley with the victim four hours
prior to the discovery of the body was held to be insufficient evidence upon which to
base a conviction. Obviously this holding would apply to Lobaugh as well as Christen.
The additional element, Lobaugh's confession to the killing, is of questionable sig-
nificance due to the doubt cast upon it by scientific tests coupled with the rejection of
his confession to the Conine slaying in the Click case.
9. See 3 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 124 (1827); BEST, THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 559-573 (12th ed. 1922); GRoss, CRIMINAL
PSYCHOLOGY 31 (1911); MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSY-
CHOLOGY AND CRIME 144 (1933).
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many cases to the inexplicable category. The ordinary and expected moti-
vation for confessions of guilt is a natural desire to tell the truth and ease
the consci nce, but other stimuli may overpower this human tendency.
Often the factual circumstances manifest the purpose underlying false
confessions. But in other cases, despite the confession, factual justification
is lacking entirely or is extremely vague. Implicit in the latter situation are
various psychological motivations. Accordingly, an examination of at-
tempted classifications reveals the amenability of motives to a dual
categorization :10 those psychological in nature 11 and those based upon
some rational objective. As an analytical aid in the study of the problem
and of suggested remedies, such systemization seems the most useful.
In the case of confessions with no apparent psychological basis, the
confessor may seek no personal benefit, but a plan exists in the party's
mind and a specific end is envisaged. 12 Indicative of the importance of
the confessor's goal is his willingness to sacrifice his life to achieve it.
Confessions made under expectation of judicial leniency have been
common in the annals of judicial history.18 The suspect perceives that
aroused public opinion and circumstantial evidence point a strongly accus-
ing finger at him and, realizing the great possibility of conviction, he
may choose to confess falsely in the hope that his cooperation may be re-
warded by a sentence less severe than the maximum.1 4 Another factor
10. See HUDSON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUL 227 (4th ed. 1912), for an
attempted enumeration.
11. "There is however, a different class of cases which occur now and again
when the judgment is overthrown, and the mind being in a state of complete subjection
and prostration, an untrue confession is made, the person confessing really believing
himself guilty. In such cases the story is often fabricated with much ingenuity and
tact." ARNOLD, PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO LEGAL EVIDENCE AND OTHER CONSTRUCTION
OF LAW 335 (1913); see also, BENTHAM, op. cit. supra note 9, at 125; MUNSTER ERG,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 147; 1 WHARTON AND STILLE, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE § 804
(3d ed. 1873).
12. See BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932) passint. For a collection
of cases on witchcraft involving self accusation see BURR, NARRATIVE OF THE WITCH-
CRAFT CASES 1648-1706 (1914). For a recent example of the practice see BECK, THE
RUSSIAN PURGE AND THE EXTRACTION OF CONFESSION 42 (1951), in which it is stated:
"A rule to which there were practically no exceptions was that no interrogation could be
concluded except with a confession from the accused. The extraction of a confession
was thus the essential purpose of questioning."
In a shocking illustration, two women, in order to obtain for the children of one
of them the provisions given to an orphan by the law of the country, falsely accused
themselves of a capital crime, were convicted, and as a result both died. WIGMORE,
SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 620 (3d ed. 1937).
13. See note 10 supra.
14. See BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 12, especially the Booms Brothers case p. 15.
Here the brother-in-law of the Booms brothers disappeared shortly after he had
quarrelled with the two brothers. Circumstantial evidence and public opinion resulted
in a grand jury indictment of the two men. Both brothers confessed to the crime and
were sentenced to death. An accidental discovery of the allegedly deceased brother-in-
law resulted in finding that he had tired of his wife and decided to leave her without
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contributing to the number of false confessions is police officials' desire to
clear their records of unsolved crimes-a defendant being prosecuted for
one crime is encouraged to confess to others. The accused usually agrees
since no further harm will result and his cooperation may be rewarded by
a lighter sentence.15 A further motivation for falsely confessing to a
criminal act is a desire to aid the actual guilty party. 6 Such an instance
occurred when two brothers committed a robbery and a younger, innocent
brother contrived to draw suspicion upon himself.' 7 The younger boy
was arrested, thus ending pursuit of his brothers. But at his trial the boy
produced an alibi resulting in acquittal. Meanwhile the guilty parties had
fled the country. 1 8
Only recently has scientific understanding progressed to the point
that it can be stated with certainty that untrue confessions may be of
psychological origin. Yet these are perhaps the most common,' 9 albeit
least understood, of false confessions. 20  Analysis of mental abnormal-
ities reveals a class of persons whose behavior is not characteristic of
any particular categorization of abnormality, yet who are not adjusted
to normal life. Among this class, termed psychopathic personalities by
communicating with anyone. Authorities believe the brothers confessed with the hope
of escaping the death penalty which had been demanded by the citizens. See also,
Jenkins, A Most Extraordinary Case, 24 CASE AND COMMENT 222 (1917).
15. "It has come to my attention where a defendant confesses to a crime such as
burglary or theft and in order to clear up some 20 or 30 unsolved similar cases, the
defendant is asked to confess to a number. Sometimes I have doubted whether or not
the defendant is guilty of these other offenses, but in all of these cases, . . . [the
defendant too, pleaded guilty] and there has been no contest made of it. This has been
done mostly for record purposes, but in my own mind I have doubted sometimes whether
or not the defendant committed these offenses. They do not enter into the punishment
meted out to the defendant. . . ." Through the use of the lie detector, hypnosis, and
truth serum, six hundred inmates of the state penitentiary in Joliet, Illinois, were ad-
ministered tests on this subject. The results showed that approximately forty per cent
of the prisoners interviewed were not guilty of the crime for which they were
sentenced. It should be noted that tests demonstrated that all of these men were guilty
of some crime, although not of the one for which they were charged. Communications
to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from the District Attorney of Dallas, Texas, and Captain
Donald L, Kooken, Director of the Institute of Criminal Law Administration, Indiana
University.
16. See note 10 supra.
17. 1 CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 85 (2d ed. 1826).
18. Illustrative of -this is a situation recently reported in the Louisville Courier-
Journal, Oct. 7, 1952, p. 1, col. 1. In the course of prosecution for another crime it was
related that the defendant's older brother had been murdered, and another brother had
been accused of the crime. An attorney advised the defendant that the brother might be
saved from the death penalty if the defendant confessed to the crime. He did this,
was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder. He was then
pardoned.
19. See note 10 supra.
20. Results of examinations of criminals show approximately 10% of them to be
psychopathic cases. GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 382-394
(1952).
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authorities,2 1 are numerous pathological liars and accusers. 22 Pathologi-
cal accusation has been characterized as ". . . false accusation indulged in
apart from any obvious purpose. Like the swindling of pathological liars,
it appears objectively more pernicious than the lying, but it is an ex-
pression of the same tendency. The most striking form of this type
of conduct is, of course, self-accusation. Mendacious self-impeachment
seems convincing of the abnormality."' 23  Of extreme importance to an
intelligent approach to this problem is the realization that the patho-
logical liar is difficult to detect because of his normal outward appearance
and his staunch belief in the truthfulness of his utterances. 24 Neverthe-
less, efficient law enforcement and medical analysis have led to the
discovery of numerous pathologically caused confessions.2 5 Pathological
21. This term has been said to include those who are fanatics, emotionally un-
stable, "moral imbecils," vagrants, sadists, habitual criminals, kleptomaniacs, pyro-
maniacs, sexual perverts, pathological liars, and swindlers. OVERtUOLZER AND RICHMOND,
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 185 (1947).
"Psychopathic personalities appear to be a product of emotional insecurity in early
childhood. They are characterized by a complete inability to perceive the character of
their acts or to accept responsibility for their misdeeds. They are unable to profit
from experience, and will repeat the same or similar acts over and over. They feel
no guilt or remorse for their conduct, except that when apprehended they will apologize
profusely and beg for another chance." Legislation, 10 U. OF PIr. L. Rrv. 578 (1949).
For material concerning the psychopath generally see Coon, Psychiatry for the Lawyer:
Common Psychiatric States Not Due to Psychosis, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 466 (1946); Dixon,
Psychopathic Angles of Criminal Behavior, 14 ORE. L. R-v. 352 (1935); Hulbert,
Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority in Relation to Delinquency, 30 J. Clam. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3, 15 (1939); Lipton, The Psychopath, 40 J. CrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
584, 585 (1950).
22. See note 21 supra. Pathological lying has been defined as: "... [F]alsification
entirely disproportionate to any discernible end in view, engaged in by a person who,
at the time of the observation, cannot be declared insane, feebleminded, or epileptic."
HEALY, PATHOLOGICAL LYING, ACCUSATION, AND SWINDLING 1 (1915). For material
concerning the pathological lie generally see id. at 25; WHARTON AND STILLE, op. cit.
supra note 11, § 626; GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 376-7
Pathological accusations are a constant threat in prosecutions for crimes of a sexual
nature. A more complete discussion of this phase of the subject is found in 62 YALE
L.J. 55, 69 (1952).
23. HEALY, op. cit. smpra note 22, at 2.
24. Id. at 28. In addition it is apparent that the subject gains no individual profit
from his lies and therefore external rewards to the confessor are not apparent, making
detection of these lies doubly difficult.
25. "Case of a young man of 19, with already a long record of criminalism, who
created much trouble for a court where a judge was keenly anxious to do justice. The
fellow implicated himself in a sensational murder, but investigation proved this to be
untrue. In other ways his word was found most unreliable. The question concerning
his sanity could only be answered by stating that he was an aberrational type peculiarly
inclined to criminalism and therefore needed segregation, and that he was also given
to pathological lying and self-accusation." Id. at 233. Better illustrating the situation
"... was a man of 31 years, a decorative painter by trade, who presented himself at
the states attorney's office and stated that in a fit of jealousy he had shot and killed
a man. Taking up the case it was soon found that this was quite untrue..., the man
he claimed to have killed was still alive. . . . His case history showed that he
seemed to be unable to discriminate his real and his fancied crimes .... He proved to be
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liars undoubtedly account for the many false confessions received after
the report of every sensational murder.2 6
In addition to the pathological lie, other psychological grounds for
untrue confessions, based upon theories of hypnosis and suggestion, have
been advanced by several leading authoritiesY An individual of sub-
marginal mentality may, after entertaining a fanciful notion in his mind,
ultimately become convinced of its verity. The new idea becomes so
deeply impressed upon the brain that it becomes an accepted fact. The
particular applicability of this theory has been advanced in situations in-
volving accusation and subsequent confession to a capital offense.
2 8
Constant interrogation, resulting in dethronement of reason, coupled with
suggestion sufficiently vigorous to implant the belief in the suspect's
mind, produces a confession. Many of the early witchcraft confessions
willingly introspective and stated that his inclination to lie was a puzzle to him, and
that while he was engaged in prevarications he believed in them. He always was the
hero of his own stories." Id. at 20. See also, HOAG, CRIME, ABNORMAL MINDS AND THE
LAW 106-7 (1923). A striking example of a pathological lie is that of the case of
Bratuscha "the cannibal" and his wife. Bratuscha confessed to having killed his 12
year old daughter, burned her, and then part by part consumed her. He implicated his
wife as his accomplice. At first the woman denied this; she then went to confession,
and later, told the judge the same story that her husband had related. Later it was
discovered that the priest had refused her absolution until she "confessed the truth."
Both parties had falsely confessed; the girl was alive. "The father's confession was
pathologically caused, the mother's by her desire for absolution." GRoss, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 32 n.1.
26. It has recently been revealed that there have been more than twenty false
confessions in the famous "Black Dahlia" murder case in Los Angeles. Communication
to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Marcel Frym, J.D., Director of Criminological
Research, The Hacker Foundation, Beverly Hills, California.
Shortly after a series of widely publicized slashings and attacks on women in
Chicago, Frank Gudis, a fourteen year old boy confessed to police that he had committed
the crimes. When he later repudiated the confession, a psychiatrist commenting upon
the incident stated that "the emotional immaturity of the boy could cause him to fake
a confession to satisfy his ego." It was also revealed that he had falsely confessed
to the same type crime a year previous to this incident. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 9, 1953,
p. 3, col. 2.
It has been reported that over two hundred persons voluntarily confessed to the
famous Lindbergh kidnapping. Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from
Captain Donald L. Kooken, Director of the Institute of Criminal Law Administration,
Indiana University.
27. ". . . [I]t does not require a condition of profound hypnosis to render a subject
'suggestible'; nor is any subject in full possession of his normal faculties when he is
suggestible; that is, suggestible in the degree required for the production of the
phenomenon under consideration." HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 230; see also
ARNOLD, op. cit. supra note 11, at 335; GuTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra
note 20, at 377; MUNST ERG, op. cit. supra note 9, at 147. A suggestion that hypnosis
may be a clue to the recent outbreak of confessions in Soviet purge trials is urged in
the Chicago Daily News, Dec. 20, 1952, p. 26.
28. ". . . [Ilt is well known to all hypnotists that sudden fright is a potential
agency for the induction of the subjective condition. What is more to our present
purpose, however, is the fact that a never failing emotional agency for the induction of
the subjective condition is the dread or fear of imminent and inevitable personal
calamity." HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 232.
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seem amenable to this rationalization.29  Illustrative of the situation is
the Chicago murder case of People v. Ivens, in which the defendant's
conviction and subsequent hanging were based almost completely upon a
"voluntary" confession. 30 Dr. T. Sanderson Christison, believing in the
defendant's innocence, conducted a thorough investigation of the case.31
In an effort to substantiate his belief that hypnotic suggestion elicited the
confession he requested opinions, based upon his view of the facts, from
men then renowned in the fields of psychology and neurology. Agree-
ment with his own belief was virtually unanimous. 32 Customary public
reaction to a confession of this nature is not inexplicable. That a party
would confess to a crime he did not commit is incomprehensible; there-
29. "[T]he emotional shock brought it about that the normal personality went to
pieces, and that a split off second personality began to form itself with its own con-
nected life story built up from the absurd superstitions which had been suggested to
her through the hypnotising examinations. Such confessions were given with real
conviction, under the pressure of emotional excitement, or under the spell of over-
powering influences. .. ." MUNSTERBERG, PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME 145-8, as quoted in
ARNOLD, op. cit. supra note 11, at 336; see also, HuDsoN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 228;
MUNSTERBERG, op. cit. supra note 9, at 147; 2 WHITE, A HISTORY OF THE WARFARE
OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY 151 (1897).
Here the party is not insane, he is merely under the influence of the questioner due
to the intense questioning and probing. A modern day parallel of this is the use of
grilling tactics by law enforcement officials. That such practice does exist throughout
the country is shown by the leading study on the subject, the Wickersham Report.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESS-
NESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 44-155 (1931). See authorities cited in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143, 150 n.5, 152 n.8 (1944) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238 n.11, 240
n.15 (1940). See also 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 833, 851. All persons subjected to this
grilling will not react this way, however, "[P]ersons charged with crime are not infre-
quently of defective or inferior intelligence, and even without the use of formal third-
degree methods, the influence of a stronger mind upon a weaker often produces, by per-
suasion or suggestion, the desired result." BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 12, at xvii.
30. CHRIsTISON, THE TRAGEDY OF CHICAGO (1906). This case is commented
upon in MUNSTERBERG, op. cit. spra note 9, at 163-171.
31. On January 6, 1906, a woman named Bessie Hollister was raped and
murdered. Richard G. Ivens, who had discovered the body, was arrested and charged
with the crime. He then, according to police, confessed his guilt. At the trial, there
was little evidence of consequence against the defendant except his confession. The
defendant repudiated his confessions, stating he could not even remember giving
them, although the documents were displayed to the court. The defendant produced
sixteen unimpeached witnesses to substantiate his alibi, yet he was convicted and
later hanged. See CHRiSTISo, op. cit. supra note 30. For an explanation and 'an
analysis of the suggestion process used here and in other cases, see MUNSTERBERG, op.
cit. upra note 9, at 166-171.
32. In his letter Dr. Christison explained the facts of the case and asked the
opinion of the expert as to whether the confession in the case could be explained
through the use of hypnosis and suggestion. Among the many affirmative replies
received, were answers from William James, M.D., LL.D., Phil. et Litt. D., Harvard;
H. Munsterberg, M.D., Ph. D., LL.D., Harvard; Dr. Max Meyer, University of
Missouri; H. A. Parkyn, M.D., C.M., Chicago; Dr. T. S. Clauston, University of
Edinburg; David Yellowless, M.D., LL.D., University of Glasgow; Dr. C. Richet,
University of Paris; Dr. A. Eulenburg, University of Berlin.
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fore, the confessor is guilty.33 Yet the Ivens case exemplifies the tragedy
inherent in a hastily revengeful society's disregard of objective thought
and scientific knowledge.
34
A morbid desire for notoriety constitutes a further psychological
cause of untrue admissions of guilt.a5 Persons subject to this affliction
resort to the most desperate means to achieve their desired end. Another
rare motivation is the so-called toedium vitoe, an unaccountable pro-
pensity to self-destruction. 6 A hint of this is detectable in a letter written
by William Heirens, the notorious sex slayer, to his parents while await-
ing trial.3 7
That false confessions are not an uncommon occurrence seems open
to little question, but the extent to which confessions are discovered to
be false is necessarily debatable. 8 Nevertheless, no matter how successful
present detection may be, any assumption that there is complete success
is unwarranted. Protection afforded the individual by the judicial proc-
esses appears inadequate to the task. Examination of present devices
and techniques offers substantial justification for this assertion.
33. "1 felt sure from the first that no one was to be blamed. Court and jury
had evidently done their best to find the facts and to weigh the evidence; they are not
to be expected to be experts in the analysis of unusual mental states. . . . The whole
population had been at the highest nervous tension from the frequency of the brutal
murders in the streets of Chicago. Too often the human beast escaped justice; this
time at least they had found the villain who confessed-he at least was not to escape the
gallows." MUNSERBTJRG, op. cit. supra note 9, at 140.
34. A result differing from that of the Ivens incident was reached in a case
commented upon in Cummings, The State vs. Harold Israel, 15 J. CiaI. L. & CsImI-
NOLoc.Y 406 (1924). The defendant had confessed to a murder, and there was sub-
stantial circumstantial evidence pointing to his guilt. The states attorney refused to
prosecute the case after consulting with physicians, stating: ". . . I ascertained that
it was their unanmious opinion that the accused was a person of low mentality, of the
moron type, quiet and docile in demeanor, totally lacking in any characteristic of
brutality or viciousness, of very weak will and peculiarly subject to the influence of
suggestion. It was the opinion of the physicians that any confession made by the
accused was totally without value, and they were of the opinion also that if they
cared to subject the accused to a continuous and fatiguing line of interrogation,
accusation and suggestion in due course he would be reduced to such a mental state
that he would admit practically anything his interrogators desired." Id. at 416.
35. This is a very common occurence after a particularly bloody or sadistic
crime. See note 25 supra. See also WHARTON AND STaILE, op. cit. supra note 11, § 801.
36. This is suicide by false confession. See Blackwoods Magazine, July, 1860,
pp. 54, 59; WHARTON AND STILLE, Op. cit. supra note 11, §803; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 867 n.1.
37. In referring to the Degnan murder case he wrote: "I had read a lot about
it in the papers & I then began to think of it First I knew I must convince myself
I did it & I finally by repeation [sic] in my mind & verbally I had completed it. I
then planned other things to lead to my conviction & eventually the electric chair."
Kennedy, Hoffman, and Haines, Psychiatric Study of William Heirens, 38 J. CRI-m.
L. & CiMIN LOGy 311, 337 (1947).
38. Pollak, The Errors of Justice, 284 ANNALS 115, 123 (1952).
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The role of the courts in creating devices which lend assistance in
this problem area has not been of great significance."9 For instance, the
prescription that the confession must be secured "voluntarily" sans force,
duress or abuse, is of little value in the case of a purposeful false con-
fession since such confessions are freely given. 40 But another judicially
developed device, the requirement of corroborating evidence, merits more
extensive use.41 Testing the validity of a confession is materially pro-
moted by requiring proof of the corpus delicti and the establishment of
independent facts in addition to the confession. 42 Although the corpus
delicti rule is followed almost universally, many jurisdictions limit the
requirement to facts concerning the corpus delicti, thus excluding other
corroborating facts which might aid in validating or excluding the con-
fession.43 Manifestly, to be of aid in resolving this problem, a liberal
construction is preferable.
State and federal statutory provisions have been adopted in at-
tempts to assure the trustworthiness of confessions. Some of these are
directed at prompt arraignment and prohibition of third degree tactics
while others require confessions to be in writing and signed by the
accused.14 These enactments are of undoubted value in preventing extrac-
tion of confessions by violence and coercion but assist here only in that
they preclude protracted questioning4 5 which may induce a confession by
suggestion. 46  Obviously a party so desiring may confess falsely and
commit it to writing.
Several states contribute to a resolution of this perplexing problem
by permitting appellate review of the facts in capital cases.47 Scrutiny
39. The basic reason for excluding confessions has been the fear of entering
false statements at the trial. The history of confessions shows a cyclical movement
running a gamut from almost complete exclusion to a period of little or no exclusion.
See 3 WiGMORE, EvmENcE §§ 817-822.
40. This is so except in the case of a confession produced through suggestion
or hypnosis.
41. See Ireton, Confessions and Corpus Delicti, 6 DE'ROIT L REV. 92 (1935).
42. ". . .[T]o operate in the character of direct evidence, confession cannot be too
particular. In respect of all material circumstances, it should be as particular, as,
by dint of interrogation, it can be made to be." BENTHAM, op. cit. supra note 9, at 126.
See also WHARTON AND STILLE, op. cit. supra note 11, § 200b.
43. As to the English and American rules concerning uncorroborated confessions
see 3 WIG m, EvIDENc E §§ 2070-2071 and accompanying footnotes. As to confirmation
by subsequent facts, see id. § 856 and accompanying footnotes.
44. See statutes cited in McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the
Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAS L. REV. 239, 252 n.56-61 (1945).
45. Prolonged questioning is the commonest method of "third degree." See
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAW-
LESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 153 (1931); 3 WIGmoRE. EVIDENCE § 851.
46. See notes 27, 28, and 29 supra.
47. "When the judgment is of death, the court of appeals may order a new
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of the record solely for errors of law leaves untouched those cases in
which there has been facile compliance with substantive law but which
might, upon closer examination, contain facts casting doubt upon the
determination of guilt in the lower court. 48  Non-review of findings of
fact in the appellate court leaves only a plea for executive clemency to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Permitting introduction into evidence of confessions of persons not
in court, as some states do, would further reduce the danger of con-
victing an innocent person and of failing to apprehend the guilty party.
Such statements are usually held to be inadmissible since they generally
are not regarded to be within the recognized hearsay rule exceptions of
res gestae, declarations against interest, or dying declarations.49 How-
ever, the traditional safeguards required of exceptions to the hearsay rides
are present since the statements usually derive from pangs of conscience
or are deathbed statements. Commentators make this contention in sup-
porting abolition of such a stringent exclusionary provision,50 but as yet
the majority of courts have failed to adopt this position.5 1
trial, if it be satisfied that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or
against law, or that justice requires a new trial, whether any exception shall have been
taken or not in the court below." N.Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 528. This power
of the court of appeals is apparent in the following statement: "Constitutional pro-
vision that jurisdiction of Court of Appeals shall be limited to review of questions
of law except where judgment is of death enables Court of Appeals to review facts
in capital cases." People v. Crum, 272 N.Y. 348, 6 N.E.2d 51 (1937).
See also, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1187; TEX. CODE CRIM. Paoc. ANiN. art. 848
(1948); A.L.I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 457(2) (1930) and Comments.
For other comments, see BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 12, at xxi-xxiii; ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 87 n.39 (1939) ; ORFIELD, Appellate Review of the Facts
in Criminal Cases, 12 F.R.D. 311 (1952).
48. This is only one of the possible methods of factual review. For a more
complete analysis see OaFIELD, op. cit. supra note 47, at 82. In a New York case
in which the above method of review was utilized the defendant had been convicted of
murder despite an alibi and testimony of several witnesses who said they could not
identify him for certain as the slayer. One witness did accuse the defendant as the
slayer. The court of appeals in reversing the conviction stated: "That a record dis-
closes some evidence which constitutes a question of fact which in the first instance
must be submitted to a jury, does not permit us to close our minds to the fact that
such evidence may not be sufficient to justify a jury in finding the issue in favor of
the people beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Cashin, 259 N.Y. 434, 442, 182 N.E.
74, 77 (1932).
49. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1912). See also Notes, 30 Ky. L.J.
228 (1942); 16 MINN. L. Rzv. 437 (1932); 8 TENN. L. REv. 265 (1930).
50. See 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCz § 438 (11th ed. 1935); WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE § 142; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 509 (1942) ; Wilder, Confessions of Third
Persons in Criminal Cases, 1 CORNELL L.Q. 82 (1915).
51. See note 49 supra. In the recent case of People v. Lettrich, 108 N.E.2d 488
(Ill. 1952), the court, after restating and approving the accepted hearsay rule ex-
cluding the extra-judicial statements of third persons, reversed and remanded the
case, stating: "The rule is sound and should not be departed from except in cases
where it is obvious that justice demands a departure. But it would be absurd, and
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, Elevation of the ethical standards of law enforcement officials and
prosecutors would necessarily alleviate concern over trustworthiness of
confessions. Recognition of the need for reform in these groups is not
lacking.52 Explicit formulation of ethical procedures in police service
through utilization of "Rules of Official Conduct" has been advocated by
leaders in the field.53 Prosecutors, possessed of extensive power in the
selection of cases to prosecute and of evidence to introduce, should pro-
ceed cautiously to assure consideration of possible falsity in a con-
fession.5
4
Scientific techniques have recently been utilized to a limited extent.
Truth serum has been administered in some cases, but present knowledge
is not sufficient to determine the potential assistance to be derived from
this discovery.55 The lie detector has proved useful only in particular
cases.5 6 Either the results are inconclusive or they indicate the absence of
falsehood when a pathological liar or other abnormal liar is tested.57 An-
other innovation, the electroencepholagraph, measures brain wave devia-
tions in the diagnosis of psychopathic personalities. 58 The applicability of
shocking to all sense of justice, to indiscriminately apply such a rule to prevent
one accused of a crime from showing that another person was the real culprit merely
because that other person was deceased, insane or out of the jurisdiction ...
"... The State is here relying upon a confession, which the defendant alleges was
procured by duress and fear. . . . Where the State is relying solely upon the
repudiated confession of the defendant, and that confession in material respects does
not conform to the known facts, it seems that justice requires that the jury
consider every circumstance which reflects upon the reliability of that confession, and
a confession of a third person that he perpetrated the offense is such a circumstance."
Id. at 492.
52. "The third degree-the inflicting of pain, physical or mental, to extract
confession or statements-is widespread throughout the country." "Physical brutality
is extensively practiced." "Methods of intimidation adjusted to the age or the
mentality of the victim are frequently used alone or in combination with other
practices." "Prolonged illegal detention is a common practice." NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON LA w OBSwAN cE AND ENFORCEMENT, op. cit. supra note 45.
53. Kooken, Ethics in Police Service, 38 J. Camr. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 61, 172 (1947).
54. See note 34 supra. Recent statements by prosecuting attorneys show that
marly are becoming aware of theirI responsibility: "... [A] confession is only as
good as the law enforcement officer who receives it." The protection against false
confession largely ". *.-. rests on the integrity' of the prosecutor and the court. . ....
Communications to the INDrANA LAW JOURNAL from County Solicitor, Dade County,
Miami, Florida, and States Attorney, Baltimore County, Baltimore, Maryland.
55. 3 WIGmORE, EVIDNcE § 998; Dession, Freedman, Donnelly, and Redlich, -Drug-
Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315 (1953) ; 12 OHIO S.L.J.
478 (1951).
56. 3 Id. § 999.
57. The party actually believes what he says is true. "For these reasons his
'deception' is undetectible bry this technique, or, indeed, by any other method short
of the interrogator's independent discovery or possession of the actual facts about
which the subject is lying." INBAu, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 39
(1942).
58. Arieff and Rotman, Psychopathic Personality, 39 J. CRIia. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
158, 159 n.5-7 (1948).
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these methods to deviations in human behavior, is obvious, even though
their reliability has not been fully measured. 59
Increased employment of psychology and psychiatry further reflects
the role of other disciplines in resolving .problems, which although.re-
quiring solution in the context oi. legal processes, are only incidentally
legal in character. Agitation and comment have furthered the use of
these specific areas of knowledge in. the courts,60 but the procedures
generally concern persons who are, or can be, declared insane; 61 hence,
as presently constituted, these measures are of little assistance where the
problem concerns individuals in the penumbra between sanity and in-
sanity. Courts seldom, if ever, recognize persons involved in this problem
area as insane; consequently, they are not accorded the protections con-
ferred upon the insane. Discovery of the individual's aberration and
initiative in securing some type of examination is dependent upon the
discretion of prosecutors, parties, or the courts, all of whom are in-
competent in such technical matters. When viewed in this light, present
utilization of science is far from satisf.ctory.
An alteration in the evidentiary weight to be given a confession
might, at least theoretically, further diminish the danger of a miscarriage
of justice. Certainly complete elimination of the confession would ac-
complish the goal,62 but it is questionable what good could accrue from
giving a confession the highest evidentiary value.63 Either of these two
approaches seems extreme when compared with the obvious remedy-
59. "Every step in the promotion of scientific crime detection is a step towards
the abolition of the cruel and ineffective methods of establishing criminal identity,
such as the 'third degree,' and also a step towards the realization of a criminal trial un-
hampered by technical procedure and unreliable evidence. The use of brutality by
the police in securing confessions, the reception of flimsy testimony as to identity,
and the ineffectiveness of circumstantial evidence may be curtailed by more reliance
upon scientific data and less reliance upon individual 'reasoning."' Baker and Inbau,
The Scientific Detection of Crime, 17 MINN. L. REy. 628 (1933). See also
GurrTACHER AND WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 367-71.
60. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 67, 449 (1925); HEALY,
THE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT 729 (1915) ; MUNSTERBURG, op. Cit. supra note 9, at 138
139, 150; Bromberg & Cleckley, The Medico-Legal Dilemna A Suggested Solution,
42 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 730, 737, 741 (1952); Bychowski & Curran, Cur-
rent Problems in Medico-Legal Testimony, 37 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 16 (1946);
Cohen, The Joint Effort of Law and Psychiatry, 24 CONN. BAR J. 337, 355 (1950);
Glueck, State Legislation Providing for the Mental Examination of Persons Accused
of Crime, 14 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573, 585 (1924); Kahn, The Lawyer and the
Psychiatrist, 21 CONN. BAR J. 112 (1947); Kinberg, Forensic Psychiatry Without
Metaphysics, 40 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 555 (1950) ; Selling, Forensic Psychiatry,
39 3. CRi . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 606 (1949).
61. Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of Experts: Hospital Examination of
Criminal Defendants Before Trial, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 419, 421 (1935) ; Weihofen
& Overholzer, Commitment of the Mentally 1ll, 24 TEXAs L. REV. 307 (1945).
62. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 866 n.1, 2.
63. 3 id. § 866 n.3.
NOTES
more painstaking efforts to assure that the confessions are true. Success-
ful accomplishment in this endeavor could be patterned upon the British
system of justice where, as a result of strict judicial control of police prac-
tices, few cases of coerced confessions have arisen. 64 A similar advance
in the detection of untrue admissions of guilt could be predicated upon
an elevation of American law enforcement ethics to a level comparable
with those of the British.
It is apparent that available current practices in the United States
leave much to be desired. Action of a discretionary nature which leaves
initiative in the hands of laymen completely unfamiliar with the technical
complexities involved must be replaced by procedures of. a more syste-
matic and comprehensive character which would utilize, ,whenever feas-
ible, the best in science and related knowledge. Awareness of- possible
courses of action to develop remedial procedures is -a prerequisite to
progress in successful discovery of false confessions,
IV
Inextricably involved in the search of a desideratum for eliminating
the unwanted false confession is a weighing of values-the methods
adopted must not only be workable and fair, they must afford both
society and the individual an opportunity to ascertain the true state of
facts. Since the untrue confession is not a problem present in many cases,
law enforcement officials must not be unreasonably hampered in the
apprehension of criminals. Yet to ferret out those instances in which
false confessions do occur requires formulation of an effective plan.
Application of the following suggestions only in cases involving capital
punishment promises reconciliation of these conflicting aims. Officials
should have little cause for complaint since there are relatively few
capital cases, and those involving confessions are even less frequent.
Moreover, police officials should not be subject to the gratuitous imputa-
tion that they do not desire to bring the actual culprit to justice.
False admissions of guilt with no apparent psychological basis seem
to be the least recurring and are easier to detect. Since some underlying
motive is usually present in such situations, diligent investigative work
will expose the untrue statement. Indeed, the only reason for failure to
detect this class of false confessions is lack of persistence in unearthing
64. "In giving evidence of such admissions or confessions it lies upon the prosecu-
tion to prove affirmatively to the satisfaction of the judge who tries the case that the
admissions were not induced by any promise of favour . . . or pressure by a person in
authority." 9 HALsuuRy's LAws oF ENGLAND § 291n. (m) (2d ed. 1933) and cases cited.
See also Note, 43 HAv. L R~v. 617, 618 n.6 (1930).
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facts. " Primary blame for this laxness is possibly attributable to the public
demand that someone be punished for a crime.6 5 The police, in reaction
to such pressures, attempt to secure a conviction at all costs. Securing a
confesion is the usual result, since gathering evidence connecting the
guspect to the crime is a much more difficult process. The potential evils
implicit in such shortcuts seem to underlie most of the movements agi-
tating for complete elimination of confessions. Manifestly, if confessions
are to continue to possess evidentiary significance, careful scrutinization
as to their truthfulness should be standard procedure in order to avoid
the dangers inherent in an improvident treatment of them. 66
If evidence in addition to the admission of guilt is extremely difficult
to obtain, substantiation of the confession may be more readily accom-
plished by increased utilization of lie detector tests.67 The invalidity and
inconsi§stelcy of a confession may be confirmed through comparison of
the answers received from the suspect, the results shown by the machine,
and the known facts concerning the crime. Adherence to this course not
only would tend to eliminate the danger of convicting the wrong person
but could, result in a conviction of the guilty party without the necessity
of introd'4cing the confession into evidence.
Numerous cases in which a confession has been received also embody
a plea' of guilty, With little or no additional evidence. More than a mere
guilty' pled should be the basis of criminal convictions, particularly where
capital punishment is prescribed. 68' Consequently, legislative action pro-
hibiting. imposition of a death sentence based solely upon a plea of guilty
65. See fiote 33 supra, and Ehrmann, The Death Penalty and the Adnzinfstration of
Justice, 284 ANNALs 73, 77 (1952).
66. "If a confession is made, all that is perceived in the case may be seen in the
light of it, and experience teaches well enough how that alters the situation. There is
so strong an -inclination to pigeonhole and adopt everything perceived into some given
explanation, that the explanation is strained after, and facts are squeezed and trimmed
untilthdy fit easily.... This is a matter of daily experience in our professional as well
as in our ordinary affairs. We hear of a certain crime and consider the earliest data.
For bne reason or another we begin to suspect A as the criminal. The result of an
examination of the premise is applied in each detail to this proposition. It fits. So
does the autopsy, so do the depositions of the witnesses. Everything fits. There have
indeed been a few difficulties, but they have been set aside, they are attributed to in-
accurate observation and the like,-the point is,-that the evidence is against A. Now,
suppose that soon after B confesses the crime; this event is so significant that it sets
aside at once all the earlier reasons for suspecting A, and the theory of the crime
now involves B. Naturally the whole material must be applied to B, and in spite of
the fact that it at first fitted A, it does now fit B." GRoss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 33.
67. For previous discussion of corroboration, see notes 42 and 43 supra.
68. See N.J. REV. STAr. § 2:138-3 (1937). "In no case shall the plea of guilty be
receivel upon any indictment for murder, and if, upon arraignment, such plea should
be offered, it shall be disregarded, and the plea of not guilty entered, and a jury, duly
impaneled,' shall try the case in manner aforesaid." In State v. Smith, 109 N.J.L. 532,
162 Atl. 752 (1932), a conviction was reversed due to evidence of a plea of guilty
being entered in the proceeding.
NOTES
would be an advisable corrective measure. In the course of establishing
actual guilt the false confessor may be discovered and released, thus
preventing "legalized suicide" and making possible ultimate apprehension
of the person who is a menace to society.
Although of course no panacea has been discovered, the false con-
fession enigma in the area of non-psychological motivations should be
subject to decreasing concern. Concerted efforts by legal reformers and
sociologists coupled with United States Supreme Court scrutiny of due
process violations in criminal cases has resulted in -better and more
exacting police and court procedures.69 Such is not the case, however,
with the false confession caused by psychological aberrations. Despite
scientific progress in the treatment of psychopathic individuals, utilization
of this new knowledge by the courts has been slow.7"
As contrasted to measures directed toward the insane person, little
legislation concerning other than the sexual psychopath, has been
enacted. 71 In the usual case the psychopath is held to the same standards
as the normal person; therefore, no effort is expended to discover whether
or not a person is psychopathic. To the uninformed the psychopath's
calm, apparently rational behavior is that of the perfectly normal person. 72
This suggests that officials concerned daily with criminal processes
should be apprised of the fact that psychopaths may not be identified as
such on sight.73 Also needed is a wider realization that the psychopathic
person may be, among other aberrations, a pathological liar, or for
various reasons, extremely amenable to suggestion. 74 The import of these
proposals is that a procedure must be developed which will, as a matter
of course, discover the psychopathic confessor.
Careful examination of each confessor by competent personnel
would adequately accomplish the desired end.75 Many states have enacted
69. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49 (1949) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) ; Harris v. South Carolina, 338
U.S. 68 (1949); Cogshall, Are We Buying The Trojan Horse? The Need for Police
Respect of Constitutional Rights, 40 J. CRmI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242 (1949).
70. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 60, at 67; Bromberg & Cleckley, supra note 60, at
741.
71. See ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 820-5 (1948) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3401-12 (Burns
1942 Repl.) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2901-7 (1943) (1949) (Cum. Supp.). See also Notes,
40 J. Cam!. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 186 (1949); 60 YALE L.J. 346 (1951).
72. Uninformed persons, which may include the judge and the prosecutor, are more
impressed by external symptoms of the traditional raving maniac than by the calm,
apparently normal behavior of a pathological liar or a party easily subject to suggestion.
Some persons find it very easy and not unjustifiably so, to class most psychopaths as
normal upon a cursory examination and subject them to normal standards, usually
without even an opportunity for any type psychiatric examination. See Bromberg and
Cleckley, supra ;wte 60, at 737; Pollak, supra note 38, at 121.
73. Bychowski & Curran, supra note 60.
74. See note 21 supra.
75. Kinberg, supra note 60, at 557.
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measures providing for examination of suspected insane persons. Among
other provisions, the suspect is placed in custody of the state mental
hospital for observation, after which a report is made to the court.76 A
suggested Pennsylvania statute would permit any individual, including
the district attorney, to request a mental examination of any accused
suspected of abnormality. 7 7 Criminal proceedings in several European
countries utilize similar procedures." Adaptation to this particular prob-
lem of the principles upon which the insanity statutes operate would pre-
sent no great difficulty.79 Nevertheless, under most insanity statutes insti-
gation of an examination is either discretionary, or responsibility for
initiating remedial procedures is not squarely placed. Proper resolution of
a problem in which society has so great an interest permits no such possi-
bility for laziness or neglect in administration.
One statutory scheme offers hope for ultimate elimination of the
false confession problem. Under a Massachusetts law8 0 a person indicted
for a capital offense, or any person previously indicted and convicted of
a felony, must be examined by the Department of Mental Health.8 1
Subject to a fine for failure to act, the clerk of the criminal court is
required to notify the board of review within the Department that a
defendant should be examined. 2 The goal contemplated in this legis-
lation, within which the psychopathic false confessor certainly fits, is
discovery of the abnormal non-responsible defendant. Apart from such
legislation, initiative on the part of the prosecutor could result in action
of the type envisaged by the Massachusetts statute.88  Close cooperation
76. Weihofen, supra note 61, at 421.
77. See Legislation, 10 U. of PITT. L. REv. 578 (1949).
78. Aschaffenburg, Psychiatry and Criminal Law, 32 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
3, 7 (1941).
79. It is again suggested that these provisions be applied only in cases of a more
serious nature until their effect upon judicial administration can be determined.
80. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 123, § 100A (1949). For a general history of the
"Briggs Law" see Overholzer, The History and OperationL of the Briggs Law, of
Massachusetts, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 436 (1935).
81. The object is ". . . to determine his mental condition and the existence of
any mental disease or defect which would affect his criminal responsibility." MAss.
ANN. LAWS c. 123, § 100A (1949).
82. The probation officer is required to notify the clerk of all past criminal
occurences, while the trial judge may also send the defendant to the board for
examination.
83. A North Carolina prosecutor recently disposed of a murder case in this
manner. One of the suspects for the murder implicated himself seriously in the crime.
Thereafter he confessed the crime. After the confession the man was interviewed
numerous times by doctors, during which time it developed he was of low mentality.
He was sent to a state institution for eight months and was later released.
He was never prosecuted for the crime, since careful investigation plus the use of
scientific knowledge proved his confessions to be false. Communication to the INDIANA
LAW JOURNAL from the Solicitor, Mecklenburg County, Charlotte, North Carolina.
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between established psychiatric clinics and court officials would also assist
the prosecutor who questions a defendant's mental stability.
84
Upon adoption of a policy of psychological review it would become
a simple matter to direct persons confessing to capital crimes to be
examined for possible psychological malfunctioning. Established clinics
already at the disposal of the court would need only a slight adjustment
in routine to administer such a program. The insignificant effort required
could reap rewards in rehabilitation of human lives through more efficient
and humane judicial administration.
Manifestly the suggested program should be initiated prior to the
trial.85 The pre-trial conference, already extensively used,8 6 would serve
this purpose for both psychological and non-psychological confessions,
affording the judge an excellent opportunity to delve into the facts of the
case in an informal atmosphere.87 Inquiry into the various motives and
circumstances present in most confession cases, as well as a report and
interpretation of the psychiatric examination, could be dealt with at this
time. The pre-trial provisions of the original draft of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure could be readily adapted to this situation.88 En-
84. See GUTrMACHER AND WUIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 259-64. A similar
proposal was made in the Committee Report of the Psychopathic Laboratory, Police
Department, City of New York, December 1917, p. 15, cited in GLUEcK, op. cit. supra
note 60, at 473. "But the clinics for sorting out the mentally unsound offender, espe-
cially the socially expensive recidivistic misdemeant, should be attached to the lower
courts and the experienced psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers in charge
of this work should be regarded as court officers."
The National Crime Commission in its Report on the Medical Aspects of Crime
recommended " . . . that each court have available not only psychiatric service but
psychologists and social investigators, the work of this tribunal being furthered by the
enactment of a law similar in principle to the Briggs Law of Massachusetts." Patter-
son, Psychiatric Aspects of New Procedures in the State of Michigan, 31 J. Clam. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 684, 691 (1941). The report of the 52d Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association is to the same effect. Id. at 690.
85. ". . . [I]t is more efficient, economical and humane to sort out, before trial,
those accused persons who are mentally abnormal than to subject such persons to the
ordeal of a trial only to be compelled to transfer them early during their prison service
to some hospital for mentally ill." Glueck, supra note 60 at 573. This same view may be
applied to the situation here. See also note 84 supra; many of the views expressed there
are applicable before the commencement of the trial.
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
87. "The atmosphere being informal, there is much more likelihood of getting to
an agreement on many of these matters at such a conference than is possible at an actual
trial before an audience. The combativeness engendered by a trial is not present. The
necessity of maintaining a position taken, to save face with client or the public, is
absent. The conciliatory influence of the court prevails." Note, 26 J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y
106, 109 (1942).
88. Included within the original draft was a provision for consideration of matters
related to the disposition of the proceedings. The suggested procedure would obviously
fall within this objective. See PRELIMINARY DRAYr, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
ADvisoRY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16 (1943). See also ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO AP'EAL 324 (1947) ; for discussion favoring this
proposed rule see Berge, The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 42
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couraging comments by judges in various states who used the pre-trial
conference in criminal cases manifest the desirability of such a pro-
cedure.89 Concern as to the constitutionality of a mental examination in
conjunction with the conference is unwarranted since the tests could
do no harm to a defendant who has already confessed. 90 Moreover, the
conference and examination could clear him of the charge, thus avoiding
the expense and time inherent in the ordinary criminal trial.
By nature the frequency of false confessions is indeterminable. That
untrue admissions of' guilt do occur is demonstrable, however. The sig-
nificant effects upon the individual and upon society emphasize the neces-
sity for re-examination of the present haphazard means utilized to prevent
injustice. Substantial efforts should be undertaken to acquaint those
intimately concerned with the criminal processes that voluntary, untrue
confessions do take place and that available measures should be used to
avoid the dangers of convicting the innocent. Similar endeavors should
be made to enhance the efficacy of the judicial process in detecting the
psychopathic individual who is prone to self-accusation. Although in-
creased psychiatric knowledge is needed, measures designed to incorporate
presently available techniques, as well as such advances in diagnosis and
treatment as occur in the future, constitute an important prerequisite to
progress in the administration of criminal justice.
PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTIES UNDER
CONTRACTUAL LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY
If one were to store a fur coat, or to leave his car in a parking 16t,
the chances are good that the contract governing the transaction would
contain a stipulation limiting the liability resulting from any damage
MICH. L. REv. 353, 364 (1943); Dession, The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 18 CONN. BAR J. 58, 67 (1944); HOLTZOFF, Reform of Federal Crinindl
Procedure, 12 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 119 (1944); for discussion against adoption of the
rule see Baiter, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 20 CALIF. STATE BJ. 91 .(1945);
Stewart, Comments on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 8 JoHN MARSHALL L.J.
296, 299 (1943).
Generally on the advisability of this procedure in cases involving mental in-
capacity see Cohen, supra note 60, at 356.
89. "Experience with pretrial in criminal cases has not been common, but where
tried, it has yielded results of great value." Note, 26 J. Am. Jun. Soc'v 106, 107
(1942) ; see also Way, New Technique Facilitates Criminal Trials, 25 3. Al. Jim.
Soc'y 120 (1941).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 35 provides for this examination in civil cases. This pro-
vision was upheld in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1940).
NOTES
to the goods to a sum relatively small in relation to their value.' Such
stipulations, commonly termed limitations of liability, have received
varied treatment by the courts. 2 In many situations courts have held
them void as against public policy.3 Some courts have refused to give
them effect on the theory that the customer had no notice of the condition
and did not consent thereto.4  A significant number of jurisdictions,
however, have upheld this type of limitation as being a permissible area
of contract.5 A debate on the merits of these differing positions is not
essential to consideration of a question which arises in those jurisdictions
which give effect to the limitations of liability. Who, other than the con-
tracting party, is entitled to the protection afforded by the stipulations in
question ?
The Ohio case of Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Service6
illustrates this problem. A Mrs. Oberhelman contracted with Jenny, Inc.
to store her fur coat for the summer. For purposes of limiting liability
for possible damage to the coat, the value thereof was set at $100.00.7
The defendant, United Parcel Service, was instructed by jenny, Inc. to
pick up the coat and deliver it to them. During delivery, the coat was
damaged.
Since Ohio gives effect to contractual limitations of liability, it is
obvious that Jenny, Inc. could be held liable only to the extent of
1. E.g., liability for damage to a mink coat was limited to $100.00, hardly market
value. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Service, 89 Ohio App. 477, 99 N.E.2d
794 (1950).
2. See generally, Pierre Dessaulles, Clauses of Non-Liability, 7 Rev. du B. 147
(1947) ; R. J. Guglielmino, Contracts; Legality; Exemptions from Liability for Negli-
gence, 20 CORNELL L. Q. 352 (1935) ; McClain, Contractual Limitations of Liability for
Negligence, 28 HAv. L. REv. 550 (1915); C. H. Rehm, Contracting Against Liability
for Negligent Conduct, 4 Mo. L. REv. 55 (1939) ; Notes, 37 COL. L. REv. 248 (1937) ;
35 Mirm. L. REv. 197 (1951) ; 25 TULANE L. REv. 268 (1951) ; 4 VA'D. L. REV. 346
(1951).
3. E.g., Kaylor v. Magill, 181 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1950); Housing Authority of
Birmingham Dist. v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 14 So.2d 527 (1943); Apache Ry. Co. v.
Shumway, 62 Ariz. 359, 158 P.2d 142 (1945) ; Freigy v. Gargaro Co., 223 Ind. 342, 60
N.E.2d 288 (1945); Wessman v. Boston & M. Ry. Co., 84 N.H. 475, 152 Atl. 476
(1930) ; Tankele v. Texas Co., 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425 (1936).
4. The leading case on the requirement of notice is The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375
(1897) ; see also, Jones v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 68 Mont 231, 217 Pac. 673 (1923);
Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949).
5. E.g., Golden v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 189 Ga. 79, 5 S.E.2d 198
(1939); Globe Home Improvement Co. v. Perth Amboy Chamber of Commerce Credit
Rating Bureau, 116 N.J.L. 168, 182 Atl. 641 (1936); Paddle v. Atlantic Basin Iron
Works, 91 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1950); Barrett v. Couragon, 302 Mass. 33, 18 N.E.2d 369
(1939); Monsanto Chemical Co. v. American Bitumuls, 249 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. 1953).
6.. 89 Ohio App. 447, 99 N.E.2d 794 (1950).
7. The coat was purchased by Mrs. Oberhelman in 1943 for $2,028.35 and was
appraised in 1945 at $3,500.
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$100.00.8 It is similarly clear that if the damage had been negligently
caused by a complete stranger to the transaction, e.g., the driver of
another vehicle, full recovery could be obtained. The extent to which the
delivery company, or its negligent driver is pecuniarily liable seems to
present a more difficult question. To the Ohio court, however, the answer
seemed easy-" [W]hen it [Jenny, Inc.,] engaged the defendant to get
the coat for it, it clothed the defendant with all the authority and rights
which it, the principal, had against the owner, including the right to have
liability limited to $100.00."0 Thus, the delivery company successfully
invoked the liability limitation embodied in a contract to which it was
not a party.
If it is assumed that limitations of liability are valid, it logically
follows that this could be a proper result. Any doctrinal objections which
might arise, can be met by considering the third party a donee beneficiary
of the contract. Contemporary legal theory widely allows such parties
to assert rights under the contract.10 Such a result would be manifestly
correct if the governing contract expressly provided that the stipulation
was intended to protect employees, agents and independent contractors
handling the goods under the contract. However, the contract in question,
as is undoubtedly true in the great majority of similar agreements, did
not explicitly or even impliedly refer to the rights of third parties under
such stipulations. The contracts are silent or at best vague with respect
to the scope of protection intended. In lieu of express categorization of
the parties to be benefitted thereby, the question arises as to what factors
should be considered in determining who may take advantage of liability
limitations.
In the United Parcel Service case," the only authority or rationaliza-
tion advanced was Section 347 of the Restatement of Agency which states
that "[a]n agent who is acting in pursuance of his authority has such
immunities of the principal as are not personal to the principal." Use of
the Restatement of Agency suggests that the solution to the problem will
be determined on agency principles. There is at least a negative implica-
8. It seems to be generally accepted, however, that the limitation would have
no effect if the damage was inflicted intentionally. Arizona Storage & Distributing Co.
v. Rynning, 37 Ariz. 232, 293 Pac. 16 (1930) ; Union Construction Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 163 Cal. 298, 125 Pac. 242 (1912); Page v. Allison, 173 Okla. 205, 47
P.2d 134 (1935).
9. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Service, 89 Ohio App. 447, 456, 99
N.E.2d 794, 799 (1950).
10. Baurer v. Devenis, 99 Conn. 203, 121 At. 566 (1923); RESTATEmENT, CoNi-
TRAcrs § 135 (1932); Corbin, Contracts; For the Benefit of Third Parties, 46 L. Q.
Rzv. 12 (1930); Notes, 27 N.D.L. RZv. 347 (1950); 1 SYRACUSE L. REv. 334 (1949).
11. 89 Ohio App. 447, 99 N.E.2d 794 (1950).
NOTES
tion that independent contractors might be treated differently.' 2  Para-
doxically, the defendant in each of the recent cases in point which cite the
Restatement of Agency appears to have been an independent contractor,
although the issue is not discussed in either opinion.13  Even assuming
that the third party is an agent or that the rationale of Section 347 applies
also to independent contractors, it is :doubtful that the section has been
properly applied to this type situation; for.its'application must be predi-
cated on the theory that limitations of liability are "immunities" and on
the supposition that they are.non-personal.
That limitations of liability are "immunities" seems debatable. The
term, immunity, defies precise definition.' 4 Little attempt is made by the
Restatement to give it fuller meaning,' 5 and judicial use of the term has
been anything but consistent. An immunity has been held synonomous
with16  and distinguished from' 7 a privilege"; it has been said to be
equivalent to an "exemption"18 and a "franchise" ;19 and it has been fur-
ther confused by judicial interpretation of the privileges and immunities
clause of the federal constitution. Essentially, an immunity operates to
12. E.g., the doctrine of respondeat superior applies generally when an agent com-
mits a harm, but not when an independent contractor is responsible. Divines v. Dickenson,
189 Iowa 194, 174 N.W. 9 (1919) ; Picket v. Waldarf System, 241 Mass. 569, 136 N.E.
64 (1922); Newman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 77 N.D. 466, 43 N.W.2d 411 (1950).
13. Although the opinions give little information, it is a reasonable assumption that
both third parties involved were separate corporations of considerable size. It does
not seem that the tasks they performed were under any great degree of control by the
contracting parties. A. M. Collins & Co. v. Panama R.R. Co., 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.
1952) ; Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Service, 89 Ohio App. 447, 99 N.E.2d
794 (1950).
14. See Hohfield, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Y~ALE L.J. 16 (1913), 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Corbin, Legal Analysis
and Terminology, 29 YALEL.J. 163 (1919).
15. The Restatement does give several examples of accepted immunities: (1)
Municipality not liable for harms caused by a fire truck; (2) Parent not liable for
punishment of child; (3) Landowner not liable for injury to unknown trespasser. The
Restatement indicates that only the latter of these is applicable to an agent. See
Comments, RESTATEmENT, AGENcY § 347 (1933).
16. Ex parte Levy, 43 Ark. 42, 54 (1884) ; Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43,
48 (1872).
17. Phoenix F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U.S. 174 (1896).
18. Buchanan v. Knoxville & O.R.R., 71 Fed. 324, 334 (6th Cir. 1895); State v.
Smith, 158 Ind. 543, 63 N.E. 25 (1902).
19. Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co. v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 337, 49 S.E.
506 (1905) ; Lawrence v. Times Printing Co., 22 Wash. 482, 490, 61 Pac. 166, 169 (1900).
20. The privileges and immunities guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment seem
to be of a nature independent of common law or statutory immunities. See Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), holding that the right to
use public streets is a "privilege and immunity"; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 130 F.2d
652, 655 (3rd Cir. 1942), saying that freedoms of speech, press, worship, and assembly
are not "privileges and immunities"; United States v. Sutherland, 37 F. Supp. 344, 345
(N.D. Ga. 1940), saying that the right to due process of law is a "privilege and im-
munity." See also, State v. Griffen, 226 Ind. 279, 79 N.E.2d 537 (1948).
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absolve one who has inflicted a harm from liability.21 This does not mean
that a harm was not committed, but only that there may be no recovery
therefor.2 2  While limitations of liability also possess this attribute of
non-liability, there seem to be important differences between recognized
immunities23 and limitations of liability, both in the manner and purposes
of their creation. The usual immunity is a result of public policy as
articulated by a statute or by the common law.24 It originates in the ma-
chinery of government and in theory is an expression of the will of the
body politic. The immunity exists because the legislatures or the courts
have determined that the general public will be better served if a certain
class of persons in a particular situation be free from liability for harms
which result from their acts. Thus, a benefit has been conferred which is
contrary to the general principles of law ;25 or it might be said that the
class of persons is relieved from a burden which the general public
bears. 26 It seems reasonable, therefore, that the courts, when giving
effect to an "immunity," should consider the public interest which en-
gendered its creation and extend the scope of protection thereof only if
it is manifest that the public interest will be better served thereby. Con-
tractual limitations of liability are not, however, within the purview of
this type of immunity. Rather they are a product of private negotiation.,
representing expressions of private interests to which the contracting
parties have agreed. No social evil is corrected by the limitation of li-
ability nor is any public purpose effectuated which might importune
broad application of the limited liability. These distinctions at least raise
a doubt as to the validity of characterizing limitations of liability as
"immunities" within the meaning of the Restatement of Agency.
Even if contractual limitations of liability are considered to be within
a broad definition of the term "immunity," it still seems questionable that
the Restatement rule is immediate authority for extending the benefits
of such clauses to third persons.27 Granted that limitations of liability
21. Leatherwood v. Hill, 10 Ariz. 243, 89 Pac. 521 (1906).
22. U.S. v. Swift, 186 F. Supp. 1002, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1911).
23. See note 14 supra.
24. For example, the immunity granted to hosts by automobile guest statutes ex-
presses a policy against collusive claims against insurance companies and a policy that
one who is gratuitously rendering a service should not be liable for ordinary negligence.
Kriezie v. Sanders, 23 Cal.2d 237, 143 P.2d 704 (1944); Robb v. Ramey Associates, 1
Terry 520, 14 A.2d 394 (Del. 1940) ; Russel v. Pilges, 113 Vt. 537, 37 A.2d 403 (1944).
As these policies apply to agents also, the immunity has generally been extended to
them. Herzog v. Mittleman, 155 Ore. 624, 65 P.2d 384 (1937) ; Richard v. Parks, 19
Tenn. App. 615, 93 S.W.2d 639 (1935).
25. Ex parte Levy, 43 Ark. 54 (1884).
26. Lonas v. State, 3 Heisk, 287, 306 (Tenn. 1871).
27. It seems that the same arguments advanced for not terming limitations of
liability "immunities" might also serve as arguments for a rule that such agreements
NOTES
may be either personal or non-personal, the establishment of this attribute
should be determined by what the parties to the contract intended. 2
Courts which have relied upon the Restatement, however, have rather
summarily assumed that limitations of liability are non-personal. 29 In
effect, this manner of application becomes a means of supplying, rather
than ascertaining, the parties' intent.
As is true with respect to other contract problems, the court's func-
tion in this area should be to ascertain the intention of the contracting
parties. Whether this is accomplished by utilization of the Restatement's
personal-non-personal dichotomy or by initial examination of the contract
seems irrelevant. Resolution of the issue in this manner would be more
equitable than having the result turn on nebulous and arbitrary dis-
tinctions between agents and independent contractors,30 although in cer-
tain situations, such a distinction might be one helpful factor in
determining contractual intent.31 Certainly there are other objective
criteria which the courts might seize upon in ascertaining intent. For
example, the customer may agree to the liability limitation only because
he had faith in the skill and prudence of the individual with whom he
contracts. -3 2  If the work is then delegated, it would be harsh to deny
the customer full recovery from the careless third party. The significance
of this factor would often depend upon the purpose for which the con-
tract is made. It should be of greater importance, for example, where
the contract is for the repair of a watch than where it is for parking
space for an automobile.
are "personal" rather than non-personal. That is, an immunity would be personal unless
there is an underlying public policy which would be served by permitting third parties,
as well as the contracting party, to benefit. There is, however, no apparent public policy
underlying a limitation of liability.
28. The notion that some contracts are personal is not new. For example, it is
a familiar rule of law that personal contracts are non-assignable. Rochester R.R. v.
Rochester, 205 U.S. 237 (1906); Paige v. Faure, 229 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E. 898 (1920).
The determination of whether the contract is personal and non-assignable is dependent
upon the intention of the parties to the contract as expressed or implied from the cir-
cumstances. Crana Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Heating Co., 147 Md. 588,
128 AtI. 280 (1925).
29. A. M. Collins & Co. v. Panama R-R., 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Employers'
Fire Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Service, 89 Ohio App. 447, 99 N.E.2d 794 (1950).
30. To have liability turn on whether the defendant is an agent or an independent
contractor is to encourage litigation. Further, there is no apparent reason why a
limitation of liability should be granted to an agent and denied to an independent
contractor.
31. E.g., if the contract states the limitation is to apply to those under control of
the contracting party, it would be a fair inference that agents, but not independent
contractors, were included.
32. Paige v. Faure, 229 N.Y. 114, 115, 127 N.E. 898, 899 (1920) (Held that a
contract granting an automobile agency was non-assignable since it involved a personal
relationship between the promisee and promisor).
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A criterion deemed significant by one court was whether the parties
to the contract foresaw that various employees, agents and independent
contractors would be handling the goods. 3 3 The theory behind this is
that the parties, knowing that others would necessarily be involved in
performing the contract, must have intended the limitation to apply to
them as well as to the contracting party. One could as well argue, how-
ever, that if the parties knew others were to handle the goods, they would
have explicitly stated any exceptions intended to apply to the ordinary
liabilities of such parties.
Perhaps the most significant factor is that of insurance, for in many
contracts here in question the customer is offered alternative rates A4
The lower charge provides for limited liability, while the higher rate
allows full recovery. The difference in rates is thus in the nature of an
insurance premium. If the customer has already insured the goods or if
he considers himself self-insured, he will contract at the lower rate. Cer-
tainly this is some indication that he intends the stipulation to have broad
coverage and to rely upon his insurance for indemnification in case of
injury to his property.
Although other criteria may appear convincing in individual cases,
it is apparent that in a large percentage of the cases the circumstances
surrounding the contract will not provide any degree of certainty as to
the intent of the parties. It is quite likely that the parties had no par-
ticular intent; in such situations the decision will be little else than a
calculated guess as to what their intentions might have been. At this
point, solution of the problem involves a policy question as to whether
the courts should freely extend or narrowly restrict the scope of the limi-
tations. Recent cases seem to have adopted an attitude of liberally ex-
tending the protection of the stipulation. A stricter interpretation seems
more desirable. In view of the general principle that one should be
answerable for his tortious conduct, 35 it would be better to resolve any
doubt as to the intent of the parties against the third person who attempts
to set up the limitation of liability as a defense.
The courts have employed a similar approach in analogous situations
arising under workmen's compensation laws. In this area also an exon-
33. "That the carrier would engage such services [those performed by the de-
fendant] must have been contemplated by the parties." A. M. Collins & Co. v. Panama
R.R., 197 F.2d 893, 896 (1952).
34. ". .. [T]he undersigned hereby agrees to have effected for the benefit of the
depositor insurance on the articles listed in this receipt . . . for the value set opposite
each item, which value shall represent respectively the limit of liability for loss or dam-
age to the same." Consideration for the storage is then established in line with the
value of the items stored. Storage receipt from Kisters' Furs, Bloomington, Ind.
35. Second National Bank v. Samuel & Sons, 12 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir. 1926).
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eration from liability is involved. The employee, by agreeing 36 to recover
from the workmen's compensation fund in the event of personal injuries,
relinquishes the common law cause of action which he might otherwise
have against his employer.3 7 The problem has arisen as to whether the
employee has also relinquished his common law actions against various
classes of third persons who actually caused his injury.38 Most work-
men's compensation statutes have provisions which purport to define the
rights of injured employees to sue negligent third persons ;3 9 such pro-
visions, however, do not clearly delineate the classes of third persons
which are to benefit by the freedom from suit which the employer
enjoys ;40 consequently, the rights of injured employees to sue third per-
sons are, to a great extent, dependent upon the manner in which the pro-
visions have been interpreted by the courts. In general, the statutes have
been strictly construed, preserving whenever possible the injured em-
ployee's right to sue.41 Some courts have said that only classes of per-
sons expressly exempted from suit by the terms of the statute can claim
36. Though statutory in the sense that legislatures have drafted the statutes, the
courts have, for the most part, said that workmen's compensation rights and obligations
are contractual. The theory is that the employee must agree to the provisions of the
statute before such provisions become binding upon him. Beausoleil's Case, 321 Mass.
344, 73 N.E.2d 461 (1948) ; Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 65 S.E.2d 575 (1951).
37. For discussions of the development of compensation as a remedy for injured
workmen see DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 1-26 (1936);
HOROVITz, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 7-10 (1944).
38. Employees frequently attempt to recover in common law actions rather than
accept awards from compensation funds in view of the fact that the measure of damages
may be substantially different. The schedules for statutory compensation are based upon
a loss in earning power. See Indiana State Housing Ass'n v. Clack, 110 Ind. App. 504,
39 N.E.2d 451 (1942); Miller v. James McGraw Co., 184 Md. 529, 42 A.2d 237 (1943);
Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel Co., 223 N. C. 233, 25 S.E.2d 865 (1943). In a common
law action, however, such factors as pain, suffering, mental anguish, and disfigurement,
as well as loss in earning power, are factors in determining damages. McCoMlCIC,
DAMAGES, 299-322 (1935).
39. E.g., 44 STAT. 1440 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1946) (Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1213 (Bums 1952);
MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 152, §15 (1950); N.Y. WORKMFN'S COMPENSATION LAW §29;
Va. Code § 65 (1950). West Virginia seems to be the only state which does not have
a third party provision in its Workmen's Compensation Law.
40. The statutes commonly provide that the injured employee may maintain a
common lav action against persons "other than the insured." 44 STAT. 1440 (1927), 33
U.S.C. § 933 (1946).
41. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1945); Wells v. Lavitt, 115 Conn.
117, 160 Atl. 617 (1932); Albert v. Hudson, 49 Ga. App. 636, 176 S.E. 659 (1934);
Labuff v. Worcester Consol. R.R., 231 Mass. 170, 120 N.E. 381 (1918); Reynolds v.
Grain Belt Mills Co., 229 Mo. App. 380, 78 S.W.2d 124 (1934); Hall v. Hill, 158 Misc.
341, 285 N.Y. Supp. 815 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (although the statute said that workmen's
compensation was to be the "exclusive remedy"); Shelter v. Grobsmith, 143 Misc. 380,
257 N.Y. Supp. 353 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
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freedom from liability, with the consequence that an employee can usually
maintain an action against any person other than his employer. 42
The principle of strict construction has also found expression in
judicial interpretation of statutes in derogation of the common law.4 3
Statutes of this sort are seldom given effect beyond their clear and un-
equivocal terms, 44 with the result that persons not plainly within the
statute's protective scope have not been allowed to benefit. 45 Limitations
of liability are in derogation of the common law, and it seems that such
contracts should likewise be strictly construed. 46  The courts would be
hypocritical in adopting other than a policy of restricting the scope of
protection of such stipulations. Limitations of liability are not favored
by the law ;47 they are said to promote negligence ;48 they are often im-
posed upon the customer by the superior bargaining power of the other
party.49 Such clauses are upheld only when the courts feel that the in-
terest in preserving and promoting freedom of contract outweighs their
disposition to void such agreements. 50 To liberally extend protection of
liability limitations to third persons would be anomalous in light of
judicial imposition of strict requirements for creation of a valid limita-
tion of liability between the contracting parties.
42. McGann v. Moss, 50 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Va. 1943); Zimmer v. Casey, 296
Pa. 529, 146 At. 130 (1929).
43. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Mulford v. Davey, 64 Nev. 506,
186 P.2d 360 (1947) ; Crayton v. Larabee, 220 N.Y. 493, 116 N.E. 355 (1917); Weis v.
Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
44. Kidd v. Bates, 120 Ala. 79, 23 So. 735 (1898) ; Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425,
15 P.2d 922 (1932). The courts seem unwilling to search for the intent of the legis-
lature in such statutes, saying that ". . . no statute is to be construed as altering the
rules of the common law farther than its words plainly import." McCarthy v. McCarthy,
20 D.C. App. 195 (1902).
45. Howe v. Meyers, 94 Wash. 563, 162 Pac. 1000 (1917) ; Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio
St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
46. "The right of the ship or carrier to limit its liability for negligence to an
amount not exceeding $500.00 is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly
construed." Holmes, A. M. Collins & Co. v. Panama R.R., 197 F.2d 893, 898 (5th Cir.
1952) (dissenting opinion).
47. Luedke v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 120 Neb. 124, 231 N.W. 695 (1930) ; Crew v.
Bradstreet Co., 134 Pa. 161, 19 Atl. 500 (1890) ; see note 2 supra.
48. "It seems to us that such contracts [limitations of liability] do induce a want of
care, for the highest incentive to the exercise of due care rests in a consciousness that
a failure in this respect will fix liability to make full compensation for any injury
resulting from the cause." Southern Exp. Co. v. Owens, 146 Ala. 412, 422, 41 So. 752,
754 (1906).
49. If the disparity in bargaining power is marked, the limitation of liability will
be declared invalid. Baltimore & Ohio S.W. R.R. v. Voight, 176 U.S. 498 (1900); Cato
v. Grendel Cotton Mills, 132 S.C. 454, 129 S.E. 203 (1925). But inequality of bargain-
ing power can be present, and yet not be so great as to invalidate the limitation of
liability. Manhattan Co. v. Goldberg, 38 A.2d 172 (Mun. Ct. App. Dist. Col. 1944).
50. Manhatten Co. v. Goldberg, supra note 49; California & Hawaiian Sugar Re-
fining Corp. v. Harris County, 27 F.2d 392 (S.D. Tex. 1928).
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In the absence of express contractual terms to the contrary, there
should be a presumption that third persons were not intended to be freed
from liability. Such an approach, if adopted, would generally add cer-
tainty to the law in this area without being unduly harsh. It is a simple
matter for the businessman to expressly provide for liability limitation
of third parties if he so desires. This is particularly true when it is
realized that this problem usually emanates from use of a standardized
contract. It would seem, also, that such a presumption best fits the
tenor of the law which expects an individual to be responsible for his
negligent conduct.
RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN ADOPTION
Adoption agencies have long endeavored to place a child for adop-
tion with parents having the same religion as that of the child. However,
in a survey of nine states,1 in which nearly one-half of the population was
Catholic, only one-fifth of all children turned over for adoption were
placed with Catholic adoptive parents. Assuming that approximately
one-half of the children available for adoption were Catholic, the neces-
sary conclusion is that there were more available Catholic children for
adoption than there were eligible Catholic adopters. 2 This situation may
be even more pronounced with regard to smaller denominational groups
which are in the minority everywhere since their membership is geo-
graphically scattered.3 The consequences of a shortage of adopters of the
same religion as the child sought to be placed are obvious. In such a
situation, the adoption agency is offered two alternatives: it may recom-
mend adoption by an adopter of a different faith, or the agency may
1. This study, made by the Children's Bureau of the Federal Security Agency, of
1508 children adopted in 1936 shows that only 318 of the children" were adopted by
Catholics, while 1,031 went to Protestants, the remainder being adopted by persons of
other religions. COLBY, PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES IN ADonrION 38-39 (Children's
Bureau Publication No. 262, 1941).
2. "Indeed, representatives of both Catholic and nonsectarian child-placing agencies
reported difficulties in finding enough Catholic adoptive homes to meet the needs of
Catholic children available for adoption."
"It is possible that the relatively small proportion of adoptions by Catholics can
be explained by the fact that the number of childless Catholic families is known to be
small." Id. at 39.
3. E.g., "Placement of children in some of the denominational groups such as
Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, etc., do create problems for staff, since there are
few such families." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Mr. Roman L.
Hiremski,' Siuperinterident,'. Child Welfare, Illinois Department of Public Welfare.
